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This paper includes couples on the demand side and analyses their implications on the problem 
of adverse selection in the annuity market. First, we examine the pooling equilibrium for 
individual-life annuities and show that in the presence of couples the rate of return on individual-
life annuities is lower in case that couples do not have the advantage of joint consumption of 
"family public goods" as well as in case of a logarithmic utility function. Second, we examine the 
market for joint-life annuities. Due to their higher chance that only one partner survives to the 
retirement, couples with short-lived partners put more weight on the survivor benefit than 
couples with at least one longer-lived partner. This fact is used by annuity companies to 
separate couples according to their partners' life-expectancies. Hence, we find that only a 
separating equilibrium may exist. These results are obtained in a framework where couples are 
mandated to buy joint-life annuities and only single persons buy individual-life annuities. When 
relaxing this assumption by allowing couples to choose between individual- and joint-life 
annuities, we find that in equilibrium couples with long-lived partners buy individual-life 
annuities, while couples with short-lived partners buy joint-life annuities. However, couples with 
one long-lived and one short-lived partner may decide for either type of annuities, depending on 
the exogenous parameters. Accordingly, we identify two different types of equilibria.  
 
Keywords:  annuity market, uncertain lifetime, adverse selection, equilibrium. 
JEL codes: D13, D82, D91, G22.   1
1. Introduction 
Governments of many developed countries are now looking to reform their social security 
system in order to cope with the expected financial problems arising due the demographic 
changes. In the policy debate on the reform options, much attention has been concentrated on 
the functioning of the private life annuity markets in order to clarify the question whether the cut 
back of public pensions and more reliance on the private annuity market can be regarded as an 
appropriate measure to maintain the long-run solvency of the social security system. In this 
context, the treatment of families in the social security system is one point at issue, raising the 
question whether it makes sense to continue to mandate protection for family members, 
especially for surviving spouses, or to leave it up in the responsibility of the families (see e.g. 
Diamond 2004). 
 
However, although 75 % of men and 44 % of women of age 65 and older are married (see 
Ameriks and Yakoboski 2003) and, hence, their decision over lifetime consumption may have 
an impact on a large portion of the annuity market, research on the determination of old-age 
provision within a family is still in an early stage of development. Theoretical analysis has not 
progressed much beyond the identification of the fact that the allocation of resources within a 
family does not conform to that of a single-person household.  
 
The present contribution fits in the rare literature that focuses on consumption behaviour of a 
family over the uncertain lifetime of its members and their provision for retirement. In particular, 
two previous studies, namely those by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and by Brown and Poterba 
(2000), explore the demand of a couple for life annuities.
1 Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) find that 
the benefits of buying actuarially fair individual annuities are lower for a married person than for 
a single person. This is due to the fact that couples are able to self-insure against the uncertain 
date of death by consumption- and bequest-sharing arrangements, which is obvious from the 
following consideration: If one member of a couple lives to be very old, there is a high 
probability that his or her spouse has already died leaving him or her a bequest. This provides 
some insurance against the risk of a long life, even without a formal annuity contract. Hence, 
marriage can serve as a substitute for life annuities. While Kotlikoff and Spivak consider 
individual-life annuities (or single-life annuities), Brown and Poterba (2000) investigate joint-life 
annuities. They describe the structure of joint-life annuity products that are available to married 
couples, and calculate the potential utility gain that couples derive from the purchase of joint-life 
annuities. In particular, they estimate the amount of wealth that a couple would require in the 
                                                       
1   Another contribution that deals with couples as the decision-making units is that of Hurd (1999). It 
investigates a life-cycle model of consumption by couples to determine their optimal consumption path 
over the uncertain life-span of both partners. However, this analysis excludes the possibility of the 
purchase of life annuities in the private annuity market, but considers public pensions, which are 
assumed to be given exogenously.    2
absence of actuarially fair joint-life annuities in order to achieve the same utility level that they 
receive when actuarially fair joint-life annuities are available. Equivalently to Kotlikoff and 
Spivak, Brown and Poterba find that for a married person the utility gain from joint-life annuities 
is smaller than the utility gain from an individual-life annuity for a single person. Hence both 
papers draw the conclusion that, as most potential annuity buyers are married, their findings 
may help to explain the limited size of the private annuity market.   
 
Although these papers have recognised the importance of couples for the private annuity 
market, none of them determined the effect of their consumption behaviour on the equilibrium 
outcome. On the other hand, various contributions, including Abel (1986), Brunner and Pech 
(2002, 2005), Eckstein et. al. (1985), Pech (2004), Townley and Boadway (1988) and Walliser 
(2000), have investigated the functioning of the market for individual-life annuities, in view of the 
problem of adverse selection. However all of these studies have assumed individuals rather 
than couples as the decision-making units. The present contribution attempts to close the gap 
which was left by previous research, mentioned above, by providing a theoretical analysis of the 
problem of adverse selection in the private annuity market, when couples are included on the 
demand side. This allows an assessment of the implications on the equilibrium outcome, when 
turning away from the assumption that the consumption path of a married person over his/her 
uncertain life time conforms to that of a single person.  
 
Adverse selection arises due to asymmetric information between the market participants: The 
fact that the annuity companies cannot distinguish individuals according to their life expectancy 
induces a higher annuity demand of individuals with reason to expect long lives than of those 
expecting short lives. This leads to the well-known result that lower payouts than the actuarially 
fair ones, based on the average life expectancy of the population, are necessary to reflect the 
over-representation of annuities bought by the long-living individuals.
2  
 
This paper examines individual- as well as on joint-life annuities. First, we investigate the market 
for individual-life annuities and compare the equilibrium outcome of an economy consisting of 
single persons only with an economy in which single persons and couples coexist. For this, we 
consider the standard model with one working and one retirement period and assume price 
competition among the annuity companies, which means that they fix the price (i.e. the payoff 
per unit of annuity) and consumers can buy as many annuities as they want. In this framework 
only a pooling equilibrium can exist, where all persons (irrespective whether single or married) 
receive the same rate of return, which – as mentioned above – is below the fair one. Obviously, 
                                                       
2   Empirical studies for the well developed US annuity market give evidence that prices are about 7 – 
15 % above the fair price due to adverse selection (Walliser, 2000; Mitchell et al., 1999; Friedman and 
Warshawsky, 1988, 1990). Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) find that adverse selection exists to some 
similar extent in the voluntary annuity market of the United Kingdom.    3
the consequences of couples as market participants on the equilibrium rate of return depend on 
how their demand affects the composition of aggregate annuity demand regarding to the high-
risk and the low-risk types. Whenever the demand share of high-risk types is increased (at the 
expense of that of the low-risk types), the equilibrium rate of return will fall. We obtain this result 
of a lower rate of return in case that couples do not have the advantage of joint consumption of 
"family public goods" as well as in case of a logarithmic utility function. Otherwise the effect on 
the equilibrium rate of return on individual-life annuities is ambiguous.  
 
Secondly, we focus on joint-life annuities, which guarantee a certain payout provided that both 
partners are alive, as well as a certain ratio of this payout after the death of one partner. Hence, 
in contrast to individual-life annuities, contracts for joint-life annuities are characterised by two 
payoffs, which are fixed by the annuity companies. In the U.S. annuity market it is common 
practice that the ratio of the survivor benefit (to the payoff that a couple receives in case that 
both partners survive) varies from 50%, two-thirds, 75% up to 100%. The present contribution 
offers an explanation for the fact that annuity companies offer different survivor benefit options. 
Separation according to the survival probabilities of both couple-members takes place: Due to 
their higher chance that only one partner survives to the retirement, couples with both partners 
having a low survival probability put more weight on the survivor benefit than a couple with 
partners having a higher life expectancy. This fact can be used by annuity companies to 
separate couples according to their life expectancy. Hence, we find that no pooling Nash-
Cournot equilibrium for joint-life exists; if a Nash-Cournot equilibrium exists, it is a separating 
one.
3 These results are obtained in a model where couples are mandated to provide for old age 
through joint-life annuities and only single persons buy a pooling contract for individual-life 
annuities. 
 
However, in real world mandating couples to buy joint-life annuities is not common practice, 
instead couples can choose between individual- and joint-life annuities. Hence, in a final step, 
we combine the previous analysis of equilibria for each type of annuities and consider a 
framework, in which single persons and couples are included on the demand side and the latter 
are free to choose between individual- and joint-life annuities. Note that there is empirical 
evidence that some couples indeed buy the latter type of annuities. For instance, a recent 
survey, conducted by the American Council of Life Insurers, reports that among married owners 
                                                       
3   The Nash-Cournot equilibrium in insurance markets was studied first by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) 
and Wilson (1977). In their framework firms offer a number of different contracts which specify both a 
price and a quantity. Individuals who prefer a higher quantity are willing to pay a higher price for it. A 
prerequisite for the existence of price and quantity competition is that individuals can buy at most one 
contract, which may be a reasonable assumption for some insurance markets, e.g. insurance against 
accidents, but seems difficult to apply to the annuity market. Consequently, in our model individuals are 
free to buy as many annuities as they want. Separation becomes possible because firms can fix two 
prices instead of a price and a quantity.   4
of life annuities, only 63 % indeed choose joint-life annuities, the remaining 37 % choose 
individual-life annuities(see Ameriks and Yakoboski 2003). The present contribution offers an 
explanation for this empirical observation: We find that couples with both partners having a high 
life expectancy will decide for individual-life annuities. This is due to the fact that this type of 
annuities can offer higher expected returns to them than their separate contract for joint-life 
annuities, because in the former case they are pooled with single persons with a low life 
expectancy. Whether equivalent considerations apply for couples with one long-lived and one 
short-lived partner depends on the constellations of the exogenous parameters. These findings 
explain why we identify two different types of equilibria: For sufficiently large shares of high-risk 
types, an equilibrium may exist where couples with both partners having a high life expectancy, 
together with the single persons, buy a pooling contract for individual-life annuities and couples 
with at least one short-lived partner buy a separate contract for joint-life annuities. On the other 
hand, for lower shares of high-risk types, an equilibrium may exist where also mixed-risk 
couples buy the pooling contract for individual-life annuities and only couples with both partners 
having a low survival probability buy their separate contract for joint-life annuities.  
 
The rest of the present paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we focus on individual-life 
annuities. First, the basic model of consumption behaviour of single persons as well as off 
couples is introduced. Then, the implications of couples as participants in the market for 
individual-life annuities on the equilibrium outcome are investigated. In Section 3 we 
concentrate on joint-life annuities. First, the demand of couples for this type of life annuities is 
analysed. Then, we turn to the investigation of equilibria. First, we derive all results concerning 
the existence and characterisation of equilibria in the market for joint-life annuities under the 
assumption that couples are mandated to provide for old-age via joint-life annuities. This serves 
as a benchmark, which is then compared to the more relevant situation, where couples are free 
to choose between individual-life annuities and joint-life annuities. Section 4 summarises and 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Individual-life annuities  
Most previous research has focused on individual-life annuities with single persons as the 
decision-making units. An individual-life annuity (or single-life annuity) guarantees the annuitant 
regular payouts conditional on the annuitant's survival. In Section 2.1 we describe the model 
used to analyse the demand for this prevalent type of annuity, where we pay special attention to 
couples as the decision-making unit. We refer to two individuals as a couple, if they have 
agreed to pool their income and wealth, which is then used to support lifetime consumption of 
both partners. This will be commonly the case for married couples as well as for most long-term 
relationships. Otherwise we talk about single persons. The results obtained are then used in   5
Section 2.2 to examine the problem of adverse selection in the market of individual-life 
annuities, when beside single persons also couples are included on the demand side. This 
allows an assessment of the implications on the equilibrium outcome, when turning away from 
the assumption that the decision problem of a couple conforms to that of a single person. 
 
2.1 Demand of a single person and of a couple for individual-life annuities  
Consider an economy with N individuals with a share β of single persons; the remaining 
individuals live with their partner. Hence, the economy consists of (1 - β)N/2 couple-households 
and βN single-person households. Each individual (regardless of whether married or not) lives 
for sure in the working period; however survival to the retirement period 1 is uncertain and 
occurs with probability π,  01 <π< . During the working period, a single person earns a fixed 
labour income ω, a couple earns 2ω. We assume that no public pension system exists. Thus, at 
the end of the working period, when the individuals retire, they will provide for the period of 
retirement by the purchase of individual-life annuities. For each unit of life annuity, bought by an 
individual in the working period, he/she receives q units of payouts in the retirement period, if 
he/she survives.  
 
Preferences for consumption over the uncertain lifetime can be represented by expected utility, 
where the assumption is made that neither a single person nor a couple derives utility from 
leaving bequests to other persons. This means that there would be unintended bequests, if 
either the single person or both spouses do not survive to the retirement period. Note that, 
under the assumption of competitive firms, the rate of return on life annuities is necessarily 
greater than that on bonds.
4 Therefore a single person, who has no bequest motive, always 
decides for annuities against bonds. 
 
Taking this result into account, we formulate the decision problem of a single person: A single 
person i (with survival probability πi) chooses his/her consumption plan over the uncertain 
lifetime by maximising his/her expected utility 
 
  i0 i i 1 i U u(c ) u(c ) =+ π α , (1) 
 
subject to the budget equations  
 
                                                       
4  The general intuition for this result, which goes back to Yaari (1965), is the following: In case that an 
individual provides for old-age consumption through bonds, he/she leaves unintended bequests if dying 
prematurely. In this case, the deceased’s wealth is distributed to the heirs. If, in contrast, the individual 
puts her wealth into life annuities and dies prematurely, this unconsumed wealth is distributed as 
annuity payouts to the surviving annuitants. These considerations apply equivalently for couples, when 
both partners decease prematurely. The result of higher returns on annuities holds as long as an 
annuity company does not have the market power to collect all of the consumer surplus generated in 
the annuity market.    6
  0i i cB =ω− ,  (2) 
  1i i cq B = .  (3) 
 
in the working period t = 0 and the retirement period t = 1. In equation (1),  ti u(c )  is the per-




′ =∞, and α denotes 
the discount factor of utility due to time preference, 0 < α ≤ 1. Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) 
and differentiating with respect to Bi, we obtain the first-order condition of this maximization 
problem as 
 
  ii i u( B) q u(qB) 0 ′′ −ω − + π α =, (4) 
 
which determines annuity demand Bi(q) for single person i.  
 
A couple, on the other hand, share their combined income 2ω to choose consumption over the 
uncertain lifetime of both partners. In doing so, a couple has to distinguish between four distinct 
risk-states: Either both partners are alive in the retirement period, only one partner has survived 
or both are deceased. This is in contrast to the case of a single person, who has to be 
concerned solely, whether he/she is alive or not. We follow Brown and Poterba (2000) as well 
as Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and assume that the per-period utility function of a couple is the 
unweighted sum of the two partners' utilities. Thus, expected utility Uij of a couple with partner i 
(with survival probability πi) and partner j (with survival probability πj) is given by 
 
  ()
ss w ss w jj j ii i





1ij c  indicates consumption of partner i in the retirement period 1, in case that he/she is a 
widow/widower, represented by the superscript w. 
s i
tij c , t = 0,1, indicates consumption of partner 
i, when the other partner j is alive, thus partner i is (and has) a spouse, represented by the 
superscript s. Equivalently, 
w j
1ij c  and 
s j
tij c  denote consumption of partner j, when partner i is 
deceased or has survived, respectively. Obviously, the consumption level and annuity demand 
of a couple-member will depend on his/her survival probability as well as on that of his/her 
partner; to indicate this dependency we make use of the subscript ij.  
 
By the same argument as above, namely a higher rate of return on annuities than on bonds, 
both members of a couple will always decide to buy positive amounts of individual-life annuities 
to provide for old-age. However note that bonds, although offering a lower return than 
individual-life annuities, have one advantage over the latter: The purchase of bonds by a couple 
member, who does not survive to the retirement period, provides bequests for his/her surviving 
                                                       
5  Note that we assume that the survival probabilities πi and πj are constant over the different risk-states. 
By this we exclude the so-called "broken-heart" effect, which means that the survival probability would 
be lower in case of the partner's death than in case of his/her survival to retirement.   7
partner, while an individual-life annuity pays nothing in this case. This is the reason why it may 
be attractive for a couple to supplement annuities by some bonds, which is the case for 
sufficiently low returns on annuities only. Otherwise, couples will invest solely in individual-life 
annuities. For sake of simplicity of the analysis, we neglect a situation, where bonds may serve 




We take up the idea of Brown and Poterba (2000) and consider the possibility of goods which 
can be consumed jointly by both members of the couple. For instance, books and furniture can 
be regarded as such "public goods" for the couple. By this, the couple's budget equations in the 




ss ij i j
0ij 0ij ij ij cc ( 2 B B ) += σ ω − −, (6) 
 
ss ij i j
1ij 1ij ij ij cc q ( B B ) += σ +, (7) 
 
where σ indicates the degree of joint consumption with 12 ≤ σ≤ . For σ = 1 there is no joint 
consumption, for σ = 2 all consumption outlays of the couple are for public goods. In case that 




1ij ij cq B = ,  (8) 
 
w j j
1ij ij cq B = .  (9) 
 
The  couple's decision problem is to maximise its expected utility (5) subject to the budget 
constraints (6) – (9). Eliminating 
s i
0ij c,  
s i
1ij c,  
w i
1ij c  and 
w j
1ij c  in (5) by use of (6) – (9) and 
differentiating with respect to  
s j
0ij c,  
s j
1ij c,  
i
ij B  and 
j
ij B , respectively, we obtain the first-order 
conditions of this maximization problem, 
 
 
s s j i
0ij 0ij u(c ) u(c ) 0 ′′ −+ = , (10) 
 
s s j i
ij 1 i j 1ij (u ( c ) u ( c ) ) 0 ′′ ππα− + = , (11) 
 
ss w ii i
0ij i j 1ij i j 1ij u(c ) q u(c ) q (1 ) u(c ) 0 ′′ ′ −σ + σππ α + π −π α = , (12) 
 
w ss j ii
0ij i j 1ij j i 1ij u(c ) q u(c ) q (1 ) u(c ) 0 ′′ ′ −σ + σππ α + π −π α = . (13) 
 
From (10) and (11) it follows immediately that 
s s j i
tij tij cc =  for t = 0,1. Thus, whenever both 
partners are alive, they decide to consume the same amounts, thus – use (6) and (7) – 
                                                       
6   Alternatively, one could introduce a condition which ensures that it is attractive for couples to buy solely 
annuities.   8
s j ii
0ij ij ij 2 c( 2 B B ) σ =ω − − and 
s q j ii
1ij ij ij 2 c( B B )
σ =+ . Substituting these terms together with (8) and (9) 




ij i j ij i j ij ij ij
q
22 u( (2 B B ) ) q u( ( B B )) q ( 1 ) u(qB ) 0
σ σ ′′ ′ −σ ω− − + σππ α + + π −π α = , (12') 
 
jj j ii
ij i j ij j i ij ij ij
q
22 u( (2 B B ) ) q u( ( B B )) q ( 1 ) u(qB ) 0
σ σ ′′ ′ −σ ω− − + σππ α + + π −π α = . (13') 
 
which determine demand 
i
ij B (q) and 
j
ij B( q ) of each partner i and j for individual-life annuities for 
any given rate of return q.  
 
Lemma 1: For any rate of return q, it is optimal for a couple whose members differ in their 
survival probability that the partner with the higher survival probability demands a larger amount 
of individual-life annuities; in case of identical survival probabilities both partners demand the 
same amount, i.e. 
i
ij B( q )<
> _ 
i
ij B( q ),  i f  πi <
> _ πj. In the latter case, where πi = πj, the demand of a 
married person coincides with that of a single person with the same survival probability πi, i.e., 
i
ij i B (q) B (q) = , if there is no joint consumption of goods within the couple (σ = 1) or in case of 




tij tij u(c ) ln[c ] = . (14) 
 




ij i j ji ij (1 )u (qB ) (1 )u (qB ) ′′ π− π = π− π .   (15) 
 
Thus, if πi <
> _ πj, 
i
ij u(qB ) ′ <
>
_ j
ij u(qB ) ′  and, as  0 u < ′ ′ , 
i
ij B( q )<
> _ 
j
ij B( q ).  
 
For πi = πj, and hence 
i
ij B( q )  = 
j




ij i i ij i ij u ( ( B )) q u ( qB ) (1 )u (qB ) 0 ′′ ′ −σ σ ω− + πα σπ σ + −π = ,   (16) 
 
which coincides with (4) for σ  = 1;  thus 
i
ij B( q ) =  i B( q ). The same holds for the case of a 
logarithmic per-period utility function (14) for any 12 ≤ σ≤ . This follows from the fact that for 




ij i i ij i ij 1( B) q q B ( 1 ) q B 0 −ω − + π α π +− π =, 
 
is independent of σ.   Q.E.D. 
 
The result, that within a couple the longer-lived partner expresses a larger demand for 
individual-life annuities, corresponds with intuition and can be explained as follows: Any shift of 
individual-life annuities from the shorter-lived partner to the longer-lived partner leaves the   9
aggregate amount 
j i
ij ij BB +  and, hence, aggregate consumption levels 
s s j i
0ij 0ij cc + , 
s s j i
1ij 1ij cc + , when 
both are alive, unchanged. However such a shift provides a higher consumption level 
w i
1ij c  of the 
longer-lived partner at the expense of that of the shorter-lived partner, when only one partner 
survives to retirement. As the former has a higher weight in the couple's utility (due to his/her 
higher chance to be the only survivor), the couple benefits from such a shift. Obviously, in case 
of identical life expectancy, the couple puts equal weights on consumption of both partners, thus 
j i
ij ij BB = . Furthermore, in case that a couple with identical survival probabilities does not have 
the advantage of joint consumption compared to a single person, the demand of each of them 
coincides with that of a single person with the same survival probability (due to identical per-
period utility function of married and single persons and equal weights in couple's utility for both 
partners). Note, however, that this result also holds for logarithmic per-period utility (14), 
irrespective of the value of σ.
7 
 
From now on we assume that all N individuals, irrespective of whether they live together with a 
partner or live as a single person, are characterized either by a low or a high survival probability. 
Thus, there are two types of a single person i = L,H, while we distinguish between three types of 
couple ij = LL, LH, HH, where LL, HH, resp. denotes a couple with both partners having a low or 
high, resp., survival probability and LH denotes a couple consisting of a type-L and a type-H 
partner. Next, we investigate annuity demand of these different types. 
 
Lemma 2: For any rate of return q,  
(i)  a single person of type H demands a higher amount of individual-life annuities than a single 
person of type L, i.e. BH(q) > BL(q).  
(ii) each member of a type-HH couple demands more individual-life annuities than each 
member of a type-LL couple, i.e. 
HL
HH LL B( q )B( q ) > . 
(iii) a couple member of type i = L,H demands less individual-life annuities, in case that partner j 
is of type H compared to the case where partner j is of type L, i.e. 
LL
LH LL BB <  and 
HH
HH LH BB < , if the following necessary and sufficient condition holds: 
  
  () ( )
()
2 jj j i2 i i
ij i j ij i i ij ij ij ij
jj 2i i





u ( (2 B B )) q u ( (B B )) (1 )u (qB ) u (qB )
q ( 1 ) u( q B)u ( q B) u ( ( B B) )
σ σσ
σ
′′ ′′ ′ ′ −ω − − + π π α + − π + π >
′′ ′ ′ ππα −π −σ +
 (17) 
    
  Hence, in this case 
LL
LH LL B (q) B (q) <<
HH
HH LH B (q) B (q) < . 
 
Proof: See the Appendix.  
                                                       
7   It can be shown (by implicit differentiation of (12') and (13')) that 
i
ij B( q ) ∂ ∂σ <
> _
 0, if R <
> _
 1, where 
ii i
tij tij tij Rc u ( c ) / u ( c ) ≡ ′′ ′ −  denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion. As logarithmic utility exhibits a 
constant R = 1, σ has no influence on annuity demand.    10
The result (i) of a higher annuity demand of individuals with high life-expectancy was shown in 
many contributions, which examined the problem of adverse selection in the market of 
individual-life annuities; see e.g. Abel (1986), Walliser (2000), Pech (2004). Result (ii) offers its 
counterpart for couples: A couple with both partners having a high survival probability demands 
a larger amount of individual-life annuities than a couple with both partners having a low survival 
probability. The intuition for the result (iii) is related to Lemma 1: A type-L spouse has a higher 
relative chance to be the only surviving member within a type-LL couple than within a type-LH 
couple (obviously the opposite applies to his/her respective partner). Due to this, a type-LL 
couple will shift a higher amount of annuities from the considered type-L spouse to his/her 
partner than a type-LH couple. Such a behaviour is found, whenever condition (17) holds, for 





2 u(qB ) u( ( B B ) )
σ ′′ −σ + . Hence, condition (17) is fulfilled whenever this difference 
is non-negative (as multiplied by u0 ′′ < ), otherwise the difference must be sufficiently small. 
Whether this is indeed the case, actually depends on the specifics of the per-period function u 
and on the values of the exogenous parameters. However, it is straightforward to see that for 
σ = 1 the difference is non-negative, if 
i
ij B( q ) ≤ 
j
ij B( q ), which is fulfilled if πi ≤ πj (compare Lemma 
1). Further, it can be shown that (17) is fulfilled for the logarithmic per-period utility (14). 
 
2.2 Pooling equilibrium for individual annuities 
In this section we examine the equilibrium outcome, when there is asymmetric information in the 
market for individual-life annuities, which leads to the problem of adverse selection: Because 
annuity companies cannot distinguish individuals according to their survival probabilities, the 
first-best outcome, in which each risk type buys annuities at his/her individually fair rate of return 
according to his/her survival probability, cannot be realized. In the following, we pay special 
attention to couples as decision-making units and analyse how their annuity demand affects the 
equilibrium rate of return.  
 
In the model usually employed to study adverse selection in the market for individual-life 
annuities, it is typically assumed that competition takes place via the price (i.e. via the rate of 
return), which is fixed by the annuity companies. Individuals can buy as many annuities as they 
want. In this framework only a pooling equilibrium is possible, where all individuals receive the 
same rate of return.
8 However, for any given rate of return, individuals with high life expectancy 
demand a larger amount of annuities (compare Lemma 2). This over-representation of 
annuities, bought by high-risk individuals, accounts for the well-known result that annuity 
                                                       
8    Price competition appears to be a more plausible assumption for annuity markets than price and 
quantity competition, which requires that individuals can buy only one insurance contract (as firms fix 
both both a price and a quantity), but generates the possibility of a separating equilibrium (see 
Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson, 1977).   11
companies, in order to avoid losses, offer a rate of return which is lower than the actuarially fair 
rate of return based on the average survival probability of the population. This consequence of 
adverse selection in the market of individual-life annuities has been shown in various 
contributions, however, as far as we know, they all made implicitly the assumption that the 
decision problem of any household conforms to that of a single person, described above, see 
e.g. Abel (1986), Walliser (2000), Pech (2004).  
 
We expand these previous studies by including couples as decision-making units. To do so, we 
make the following assumptions: Let γ be the share of type-H individuals in population and β the 
share of single persons (as before). These shares as well as the survival probabilities πH and πL 
are public information, known by the annuity companies. But it is the private information for 
each single person to know his/her risk-type and for each couple to know their risk-type, i.e. the 
probabilities of survival of both partners. By this, we have introduced asymmetric information 
into the model in the usual way.  
 
We neglect any correlation between the survival probability and the marital status.
9 Then, the 
fraction of single persons of type H is given βγ and that of single persons of type L is β(1 - γ). 
Further, we exclude any dependencies between the survival probability of both couple 
members
10. By this, (1-β)γ
2 is the fraction of type-H partners within a type-HH couple, (1-β)γ(1-γ) 
is the share of type-H individuals as well as the share of type-L individuals within a type-LH 
couple and (1-β)(1-γ)
2 are type-L individuals within a type-LL couple. Given these group shares, 
expected profits are given by 
 
() ()
() () ( )
2H H L 2L
H L HH LH LH LL
2H H L 2L
H H L L H HH H LH L LH L LL
P ( q ) B ( 1) B ( 1)B ( 1) ( B B) ( 1) B
q B (1 ) B (1 ) B (1 )( B B ) (1 ) B
=β γ + −γ + −β γ +γ −γ + + −γ −
β γ π + −γπ + −β γ π +γ −γ π +π + −γ π
 (18) 
 
where, for shortness, we suppress the dependency of annuity demand Bi, 
i
ij B  on q. Note that in 
(18) a zero interest rate is assumed, which is chosen for sake of simplicity only; a positive 
interest rate would not affect the qualitative results. Since the annuity companies are assumed 
to behave perfectly competitive, the equilibrium rate of return q   is implicitly defined by the zero-
profit condition  
 
  P(q) 0 = .   (19) 
 
                                                       
9   One could presume that marriage has a positive (negative) influence on the individuals' life expectancy 
or that individuals who expect a long life have a higher preference for being married.  
10   One could think that an individual prefers a partner of the same risk type.    12
Of course, q   must be a weighted average of 1/πH and 1/πL, the individually fair rate of returns 
for each risk-type H and L.
11 This implies that for low-risk individuals expected returns are lower 
than required for individual fairness, while for high-risk individuals they are higher.  
 
Next we will compare the equilibrium outcome of an economy consisting of single persons only 
(β = 1) with an economy where single and couples coexist (β < 1). For this, we assume that 
(18), a continuous function of q, is strictly decreasing, i.e. P'(q) < 0.
12  
 
Proposition 1: Assume that condition (17) holds, which ensures that 
HH
LH HH BB 1 >  and 
LL
LH LL BB 1 < . Then the equilibrium rate of return on individual-life annuities is higher in an 
economy with single persons only (β = 1) than in a mixed economy with singles and couples 
(β  < 1), if there is no joint consumption of goods within the couple (σ  =  1) or in case of 
logarithmic per-period utility. 
 
Proof: Let  S q   be the equilibrium rate of return, determined by the zero-profit condition (19) for 
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γ+ − γ
≡
γπ + − γ π
 .   (20) 
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B( 1 ) ( B B ) ( 1 ) B
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S H L L H H LH H L L H LL H
HH LL
(1 ) (1 )
P(q ) ( ) (B B B B ) (1 )(B B B B )
B( 1 ) B
−βγ −γ ⎡ ⎤ =π − π γ − + − γ − ⎣ ⎦ γπ + − γ π
 . (21) 
 
Note that, as πH > πL, the sign of  S P(q )   depends on the last term in the squared brackets on the 
RHS of (21), which can be rearranged to   
 
 
LL H L HH
L H LH LL HH LL HH LH
SH L LH
H H L L LH LH LL HH
(1 ) (1 )B B B B B B B B
P(q ) ( ) ( ) (1 )( )
B( 1 ) B B B B B BB
⎛⎞ −βγ −γ
⎜⎟ =π − π γ − + − γ −
⎜⎟ γπ + − γ π ⎝⎠
  (21') 
                                                       
11  As Abel (1986) has argued, for any rate of return equal or lower than 1/πH, an annuity company can 
slightly increase the rate of return and profitably attract both risk-types; for any rate of return equal or 
greater than 1/πL annuity companies would suffer losses on the annuities sold to both risk-types; see 
also Pech (2004).  
12   Note that this assumption implies that there is a unique equilibrium. In general, however, multiple 
equilibria cannot be excluded; see e.g. Abel (1986), Pech (2004).   13
We know from Lemma 1 that for σ  =  1 or for logarithmic per-period utility 
L
LL L BB1 =  and 
H
HH H BB1 = . By use of these identities and (21') it is immediate that  S P(q ) 0 <  , if condition (17) 
holds. As P'(q) < 0, the equilibrium rate of return for β < 1 must be lower than  S q  . Q.E.D. 
 
Obviously, the consequences of the existence of couples as market participants on the 
equilibrium rate of return depend on how they affect the composition of aggregate annuity 
demand between the high-risk and the low-risk types. Whenever the share of annuities bought 
by high-risk types (at the expense of the low-risk types) in overall demand is increased, the 
equilibrium rate of return will fall. As for σ  =  1 or for logarithmic utility, 
LH
LL L HH H BB BB =  
(compare Lemma 1), the same-risk couples LL and HH leave the demand shares of the high- 
and low-risk types unchanged. But as 
HH
LH HH BB 1 >  and 
LL
LH LL BB 1 <  (guaranteed by condition 
(8)) there is a shift in the composition of aggregate annuity demand away from the low-risk 
"profitable" types towards the high-risk "unprofitable" types. As a consequence, annuity 
companies would make a loss, if they paid a rate of return  S q  , which allows zero-profits in the 
case of β = 1. In order to restore zero profits, the rate of return must fall.  
 
Note however that this result of a lower rate of return is not confined to σ = 1 or logarithmic 
utility, where we have coincidence of annuity demand of a single person i = L,H with that of a 
member within a same-risk couple ij = LL,HH. A lower rate of return is also obtained for any 
arbitrary per-period utility function with σ >  1, whenever 
LH
LL L HH H BB BB ≤  (compare (21')), 
which means that demand expressed by individuals who live together with a partner of the 
same risk-type do not decrease the overrepresentation of annuities bought by the high-risk 
types. Finally note that even in case that 
LH
LL L HH H BB BB > , we observe a lower equilibrium rate 
of return in the presence of couples, if this respective decrease in the overrepresentation of 
annuities bought by the high-risk types due to demand behaviour of the same-risk couples LL 
and HH does not outweigh the increase in the overrepresentation of annuities bought by the 
high-risk types due to demand behaviour of the mixed-risk couples LH. 
 
3. Joint-life annuities 
A joint-life annuity guarantees some regular payout as long as either of the two annuitants is 
alive. Basically two different types are available, where both types guarantee a main payout in 
case that both partners are alive in retirement, but they offer different survivorship options. The 
first specifies a payout-fraction which is paid to the survivor after the death of one couple 
member, regardless of which one. The second specifies a payout fraction which is paid in case 
that the primary annuitant predeceases the second annuitant, however if the second annuitant 
predeceases the first, there will be no change in the payout. In this section we focus on the first   14
more popular type
13 with "the last survivor payout rule", as it was called by Brown and Poterba 
(2000). First, we analyse the demand of couples for this type of joint-life annuities. Then we 
introduce the supply side in order to study the existence and the characteristics of equilibria, 
when the information about the survival probability is asymmetrically held by the market 
participants. Observe that in contrast to individual-life annuities, where all annuitants receive a 
single payout, joint-life annuities are characterised by two payoffs, namely the main payoff, 
when both couple members survive, and the last survivor payoff. This fact can be used by the 
annuity companies to offer different contracts for joint-life annuities to couples with differing 
survival probabilities, who in turn will choose them, as they prefer different payoff-ratios. These 
considerations give a first intuition for the results shown in Section 3.3: In contrast to individual-
life annuities, no pooling equilibrium for joint-life annuities exists; a separating equilibrium may 
but need not exist.  
 
3.1 Demand of a couple for joint-life annuities 
We consider the same framework as in section 2.1 to study now the demand of a couple for 
joint-life annuities. In the working period a couple ij with income 2ω buys an amount Aij of joint-
life annuities to provide for the retirement: Per unit of joint-life annuity the couple receives a 
payout r in case that both partners survive and a payout k in case that only one partner 
survives. Hence, the budget equations for a couple in the working period as well as in the 
retirement periods are given by  
 
 
s s j i
0ij ij 0ij cc ( 2A ) += σ ω −, (22) 
 
s s j i
1ij ij 1ij cc r A += σ , (23) 
 
w i
1ij ij ck A = ,  (24) 
 
w j
ij 1ij ck A = .  (25) 
 
The budget equations (22) – (25) are built on the assumption that a couple does not save and 
buy riskless bonds, in addition to joint-life annuities. As for individual-life annuities, a couple, 
who derives no utility from leaving a bequest to other persons, always decides to buy positive 
amounts of joint-life annuities. This is due to the fact that the returns r + k on joint-life annuities 
are necessarily greater than those on bonds, given perfect competition among the annuity 
companies.
14 However note that for sufficiently small or sufficiently large ratios r/k of payouts, a 
couple would supplement joint-life annuities by bonds in order to smooth consumption 
appropriately over the risk-states, in which either both partners survive or only one partner 
                                                       
13   Among TIAA-CREF annuitants who choose a joint-life annuity about 83 % of women and 93 % of men 
choose this option (Ameriks, 2002).  
14   The intuition is equivalent to that given in footnote 4 for individual life annuities.   15
survives to old-age.
15 Note, however, that for adequate payout-ratios r/k in between, the optimal 
strategy for a couple is to buy joint-life annuities only. 
 
The decision problem of a couple ij is to maximise their expected utility (5) subject to the budget 
constraints (22) – (25). Again we eliminate 
s i
0ij c , 
s i
1ij c , 
w i
1ij c  and 
w j
1ij c  in (5) by use of (22) – (25) 
and differentiate with respect to Aij, 
s j
0ij c  and 
s j
1ij c , respectively, to obtain the first-order conditions 
 
 
w ss w j ii i
0ij i j 1ij i j 1ij j i 1ij u(c ) r u(c ) k (1 ) u(c ) k (1 ) u(c ) 0 ′′ ′ ′ −σ + σππ α + π −π α + π − π α = , (26) 
 
(10) and (11), where the latter two imply that 
s s j i
tij tij cc =  for t = 0,1. By use of these identities 
together with (22) - (25), (26) yields 
 
  ( )
r
ij i j ij i j j i ij 22 u( (2 A ) ) r u( A ) k ( 1 ) ( 1 ) u( kA ) 0 σσ ′′ ′ −σ ω− + σππ α + π −π + π −π α = , (26') 
 
which determines demand Aij(r,k) of a couple ij for joint-life annuities for any given payouts (r,k). 
Next we investigate a joint-life annuity contract which specifies a payoff-ratio r/k = 2, which we 
call a "half to last survivor" rule.  
 
Lemma 3: If joint-life annuities are specified according to the "half to last survivor" rule (r/k = 2) 
and offer the same return r = q as individual-life annuities, the demand of a same-risk couple ij = 
LL,HH for joint-life annuities coincides with their aggregate demand for individual-life annuities, 
i.e. 
i
ij ij A (r,k) 2 B (q) = , if r = 2k = q and πi = πj.  
 
Proof: Assume that πi = πj, that r = 2k = q and that 
i
ij ij A (r,k) 2 B (q) = . Then (26') coincides with 
(16).     Q.E.D. 
 





1ij c , provided that only either partner i or j survives. Hence, in case of 
individual-life annuities they adapt annuity demands accordingly, i.e., 
j i
ij ij qB qB = , while joint-life 
annuities restrict the couples to equal consumption levels  ij kA . Further, it is optimal for couples 
(regardless of the type of annuities) to share consumption and, hence, the annuity payouts to 
equal parts, provided that both partners survive (due to equal weights of 
S i
tij c  and 
S j
tij c  in the 
couples' utility function). From these considerations it follows that same-risk couples have the 
same consumption behaviour over the partners' lifetimes, if r = 2k = q, by demanding the same 
amount 
i
ij ij A (r,k) 2 B (q) = .  
 
                                                       
15  For a sufficiently low relative payoff r/k, the couple substitutes annuities partly by bonds to increase 
consumption for the case that both of them survive. For a sufficiently high relative payoff r/k, they will 
do so to increase consumption for the case that only one partner survives.   16
Corollary 1: Lemma 3 implies that any same risk-type couple ij = LL,HH is indifferent between 
individual-life annuities and joint-life annuities with "a half to last survivor" rule, if q = r, while 
they are better off at any q > r and worse off at any q < r. This is in contrast to mixed-risk 
couples LH, who are better off with individual-life annuities than with joint-life annuities with "a 
half to last survivor" rule, if q = r. The intuition, which follows from the comments below Lemma 
1, is that individual-life annuities allow for adjustment to the higher weight of 
w H
1LH c  of the longer-
lived partner in the couple's expected utility than that of 
w L
1LH c  of the shorter-lived partner L, while 




1LH c , which implies lower expected utility given 
that r = q.  
 
3.2 Separate and pooling contracts for joint-life annuities 
Joint-life annuities are characterised by two payoffs (r,k). First of all, this allows annuity 
companies to offer contracts which differ in their payoff ratio r/k. Second, observe that a type-
HH couple has a higher probability that both partners survive to retirement (relative to the 
probability that only one partner survives) than a type-LH couple, who has in turn a relatively 




HH H 2( 1 ) ππ − π > () LH L H H L (1 ) (1 ) ππ π − π + π − π > ( )
2
LL L 2( 1 ) π π− π, (27) 
 
which is due to the assumption that πH > πL. Hence, for any given r, a type-LL couple will put 
most weight on the last-survivor payoff k, while a type-HH couple will put least weight on k. Due 
to these considerations it is obvious that annuity companies may have an incentive to separate 
couples according to their survival probabilities by varying the relative payoff. Before we turn (in 
Section 3.3) to investigate the implications of these considerations on the equilibrium outcome, 
we introduce contracts for joint-life annuities which produce zero-profits, when either bought by 
one type of couples only ("separate contract") or bought by all three types of couples ("pooling 
contract"). These are of special interest, because under the assumption of perfect competition in 
the market for joint-life annuities, only zero-profit contracts (whether separate or pooling) can 
persist.  
 
A contract (rij, kij), which is bought solely by couples of one type ij, is called a separate contract. 
It produces zero-profits, if  
 
  ( ) ij i j i j j i i j 1r( 1 ) ( 1 ) k 0 −ππ − π −π +π −π =        i, j = L,H  (28) 
 
given the assumption of a zero interest rate. Note that the zero-profit condition (28) implies that 
the joint-life annuity is fair for a couple ij, as expected payoffs equal its price. However, as many   17
contracts (rij, kij) fulfil (28), the next Lemma investigates which of them is the most preferred one 
by a couple of type ij.  
 
Lemma 4: Among all separate contracts (rij, kij), which fulfil (28) for a couple of type ij, the most 
preferred is characterised by  
 
  r
ij ij 2 u( A ) u( kA ) σ ′′ σ=  (29) 
 
which implies a payoff-ratio rij/kij = 2 for σ = 1 or for logarithmic utility, with  ij i j r2 ( ) =π + π .  
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
From (29) it is immediate that in case that there is no joint consumption (σ = 1), the "half to last 
survivor" rule is optimal for a couple ij, given their respective zero-profit separate contract. By 
use of rij/kij  =  2 and (28) the optimal contract (rij,kij) for couple ij is given by 
() ij ij 2( ) , 1( ) π+ π π+ π . For σ > 1, however, the optimum ratio rij/kij depends on the specifics of 
the per-period function. One checks easily that for any utility function which exhibits a constant 
relative risk aversion R, the most preferred ratio rij/kij determined by (29) and is larger (smaller) 
than 2, if R is smaller (larger) than 1, specifically for logarithmic utility (R = 1), the "half to last 
survivor" rule is optimal.
16 
 
On the other hand, a contract (r,k), which is bought by at least two types of couples ij = 
LL,LH,HH, is called a pooling contract. In order that a pooling contract produces zero profits, it 
must fulfil the condition, together with annuity demand Aij > 0 for at least two ij = LL,LH,HH, (for 














A 1r 2 ( 1) k( 1 ) A 1 r ( ( 1)( 1) k
A 1 r 2 (1 )k 0,
γ
−γ
−π − π −π +γ −γ −π π − π −π +π −π +




2/2, γ(1-γ) and (1-γ)
2/2 are the respective shares of type-HH couples, type-LH couples 
and type-LL couples, resp., according to the assumptions made in Section 2.2.  
 
                                                       
16  Note, moreover, that relation (29) which characterises the optimum division of consumption between 
the different risk-states in retirement, also determines the optimal division of consumption between the 
working and the retirement period, namely  ij ij
r
22 u( (2 A ) ) u( A ) σσ ′′ ω− =α , which can be seen by 
elimination of  ij u( k A ) ′  in (26') by use of (29) and (28). It follows that a couple of type ij, who does not 
discount future consumption due to time preference (α = 1), consumes the same amounts in the 
working period and in the retirement period, when both partners survive. Otherwise (α < 1), the couple 
chooses a greater consumption level in the working period, i.e. 
ss ii
0ij 1ij cc > .   18
Further note that our assumptions on the survival probabilities implies that a pooling contract 
(r,k) specified according to the "half to last survivor" rule (r/k = 2) offers the highest expected 
payoffs to couple HH and the lowest to couples of type LL, as 
2
HH H r( 1) r π+ π − π >  
1
LH H L L H 2 r ( (1 ) (1 ))r π π + π −π +π −π
2
LL L r( 1) r >π +π −π . Obviously, this relation reveals that given 
this contract, couples of type LL are the most "profitable" ones (the good risks) and couples of 
type HH are the least "profitable" ones (the bad risks). This means that on the one hand, a zero-
profit pooling contract with r/k = 2 would produce positive profits, if it were chosen only by 
couple LL, or that, on the other hand, a zero-profit separate contract with rHH/kHH = 2 for couple 
HH would produce positive profits, if it were chosen by couple LH and/or couple LL additionally. 
However, it will be shown in the next Lemma that the above relation of expected payoffs for 
different couple-types and hence their profitability for the annuity companies does not hold for 
all payoff-ratios r/k. Note that this is in contrast to many other models with asymmetric 
information (e.g. like in the market for individual life annuities, see Section 2.2), where lowest-
risk types are always the most profitable costumers for firms, while the highest-risk types are 
always the least profitable ones. 
 
Lemma 5: Consider a pooling contract (r,k) for joint-life annuities and let 
() ij i j i j i j pr ( 1 ) ( 1 ) k ≡ π π + π− π + π− π  be expected payoffs for a couple ij = LL,LH,HH. Then the 
relation of expected payoffs of (r,k) for each couple ij depends on the payoff-ration r/k in the 
following way: 
(L5a) pLL < pLH ≤ pHH, if  r
k  ≥ 
H
1 2 π − ,      
(L5b) pLL ≤ pHH < pLH, if 
H
1 2 π − >  r
k  ≥ 
HL
2 2 + π π − , given that  H
1
2 π > , 
(L5c) pHH < pLL < pLH, if
HL
2 2 + ππ − >  r
k  > 
L
1 2 π − , given that  HL 1 π +π > , 
(L5d) pHH < pLH ≤ pLL, if 
L
1 2 π −  ≥  r
k , given that  L
1
2 π > .  
 
Proof: We determine the signs of the differences pLH – pLL, pHH – pLL and pHH – pLH and find that  
 
  pLH <




1 2 π − ,   pHH <




2 2 + π π − ,  pHH <




1 2 π − , (31) 
 




1 2 π − <
HL
2 2 + ππ − <
H
1 2 π − . (32) 
 
From (31) together with (32) it follows (L5a) – (L5d) of Lemma 5.   Q.E.D. 
 
The reasoning for Lemma 5 is the following: Among all three types of couples ij = LL,LH,HH, 
couples LL have the lowest chance that both partners survive, while couples HH have the 
highest chance that both partners survive (as 
22
LL HH π <ππ <π ). However, this ordering does   19
generally not hold for their risk that only one partner survives [as 2πL(1 - πL) <
>
_





 2πH(1 - πH)]. This gives us an intuitive argument why only for sufficiently high payoff-ratios 
r/k, namely those defined by (L5a) of Lemma 5 (among them r/k = 2, considered above), 
couples LL are the best risks and couples HH are the worst risks. For lower payoff-ratios, 
however, the ordering changes, where it even reverses for sufficiently low payoff-ratios r/k, 
namely those defined by (L5d). Then, couples LL are the worst risks and couples HH are the 
best risks.  
 
Corollary 2: Note that the results in Lemma 5 found for pooling contracts has its counterpart for 
a separate contract: When drawing the zero-profit conditions (28) for a separate contract (rij,kij) 
in the (r,k)-space, denoted by ZPij, ij = LL,LH,HH in Figure 1, one observes that the zero-profit 
lines ZPij intersect at different payoff-ratios indicated by the straight lines S1 – S3. Hence, the 
position of ZPHH, ZPLH and ZPLL to each other also depends on the payoff-ratio r/k. For an 
explanation, we note that any contract on ZPij offers the same expected payoffs, equal to 1, to 
couple ij. By this, the following correlation becomes obvious: Given a payoff-ratio r/k, at which 
the expected payoffs of a pooling contract is lower, e.g., for couple LL than for couple LH, the 
separate contract for couple LL has to lie above the separate contract for couple LH in order 
that each of the contracts offers the same expected payoffs (equal to one) to the respective 
couple. This explains why the payoff-ratios below and on S1 are equal to those defined in (L5a) 
of Lemma 5, consequently ZPLL lies above ZPLH, which in turn lies above (and on) ZPHH.  
 
Figure 1: Zero-profit conditions for a separate contract (rij,kij) 
r








Analogously, payoff-ratios between S1 and S2 (as well as on S2) coincide with those defined in 
(L5b), those between S2 and S3 coincide with those defined in (L5c) and those above and on 
S3 coincide with those defined in (L5d). In the latter case, ZPHH lies above ZPLH, which in turn 
lies above ZPLL, which means that a zero-profit separate contract (rHH,kHH) for couples HH offers   20
higher payoffs than a zero-profit separate contract for couple LH or couple LL. This implies that 
(rHH,kHH) would produce negative profits, if chosen by couple LH and/or couple HH. As its 
counterpart, any zero-profit pooling contract would produce positive profits, if it were chosen 
only by couple HH. Obviously, these results on the profitability of contracts are essential for the 
incentives for the annuity companies, which contracts they will offer in equilibrium and, hence, 
for the upcoming analysis of the equilibria.  
 
3.3 Equilibria for joint-life annuities 
To investigate the equilibrium outcome in the market for joint-life annuities we make use of the 
well-known concept of a Nash-Cournot equilibrium, which was studied by Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976) in the context of insurance markets. First we show that no pooling equilibrium for joint-life 
annuities exists. Then, in subsection 3.3.2 we derive all results concerning the existence and 
characterisation of a separating equilibrium, when couples are mandated to buy joint-life 
annuities. This serves as a benchmark, which is then compared to a situation, where couples 
can choose between individual- and joint-life annuities.  
 
3.3.1 The non-existence of a pooling equilibrium for joint-life annuities 
We call a contract (r,k) a pooling equilibrium, if, together with Aij(r,k) > 0, ij= LL,LH,HH, the zero-
profit condition (30) is fulfilled and if no other contract exists, which is preferred to (r,k) by at 
least one type of couple ij ∈ {LL, LH, HH} and which allows a nonnegative profit. We find that in 
general no pooling equilibrium exists. As a preparation we show: 
 
Lemma 6: Let (r,k) be a pooling contract that, together with Aij(r,k) > 0, ij = LL,LH,HH, fulfils the 
zero-profit condition (30). 
(i)  If (r,k) is characterised by  LH rk 2 2( ) ≥− π + π any contract (r r,k k) + δ+ δ , which is 
close enough to (r,k) and which is chosen only by couples of type LL, allows a 
nonnegative profit. 
(ii) If  πL + πH >  1 and (r,k) is characterised by  LH rk 2 2( ) < −π + π , any contract 
(r r,k k) +δ +δ , which is close enough to (r,k) and which chosen only by couples of type 
HH, allows a nonnegative profit.  
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
This result follows from Lemma 5, from which we know that the expected payoffs of any zero-
profit pooling contract (r,k), characterised by  LH rk 2 2( ) ≥− π + π, is lower for couple LL than for 
couple LH and HH. This in turn implies positive profits, if only type-LL couples buy this zero-  21
profit pooling contract or one close to it. Equivalent considerations apply for any zero-profit 
pooling contract, characterised by  LH rk 2 2( ) < −π + π , given that πL + πH >  1: Then, (r,k) 
produces positive profits, if only type-HH couples buy this contract or one close to it, because, 
due to Lemma 5, it offers smaller expected payoffs to a type-HH couple than to a type-LL 
couple as well as to a type-LH couple.  
 
We now introduce a further assumption on expected utility Uij, in addition to strict concavity of 
the per-period utility function u: Indifference curves in the (r,k)-space satisfy the single-crossing 
condition,  
 









where  ij V (r,k) indicates indirect (expected) utility of couple ij = LL,LH,HH for any contract (r,k), 
defined in the usual way as utility attained with Aij(r,k). Condition (33) implies that the 
indifference curves of couples of different types can cross only once, as the slope of an 
indifference curve of a type-HH couple is always steeper than that of a type-LH couple, which in 
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which, together with (27), implies that the single-crossing condition is certainly fulfilled for any 
per-period utility function which exhibits a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion, in 
particular for logarithmic utility (14).  
 
Proposition 2: No pooling equilibrium exists, given the single-crossing condition (33). 
 
We demonstrate the result graphically (see Figure 3) in a diagram where the payoffs r and k are 
drawn on the axis.
17 The dashed line ZPP represents the zero-profit condition (30) for a pooling 
contract, the slope λ of the straight line S2 shows the payoff ratio  LH rk 2 2( ) = −π + π . First, 
consider any contract (r,k) on ZPP, which lies below or on the straight line S2. Due to the single-
crossing condition, the indifference curve VLL of a type-LL couple is the flattest. Hence, one can 
find another contract (r r,k k) +δ +δ , close to (r,k), which is preferred only by couple LL. As we 
know from Lemma 6, such a contract only chosen by couple LL is profitable for the annuity 
companies. Hence any zero-profit pooling contract (r,k), which fulfils  LH rk 2 2( ) ≥− π + π, does 
not represent a pooling equilibrium. The same applies for any contract contract (r',k') on zero-
                                                       
17   As the formal arguments to prove Proposition 2 are similar to those given by Brunner and Pech (2005), 
although in the context of individual-life annuities, which payoffs may vary over two periods of 
retirement, we refer to Brunner and Pech (2005).    22
profit line ZPP and above the straight line S2 for analogous reasons: Due to the single-crossing 
condition, the indifference curve VHH of a type-HH couple is the steepest. Therefore, another 
contract  (r' r,k' k) +δ +δ  close to (r',k') exists, which is only preferred by couple HH – and is 
therefore profitable, as Lemma 6 tells us. Altogether, no pooling equilibrium exists.
18  
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By means of Figure 2 the significance of the single-crossing condition can be discussed. One 
observes immediately that the result of Proposition 2 certainly holds whenever the slopes of VLL 
and VHH differ, independently of which one is steeper, as long as the indifference curve VLH of 
type LH-couple turns out not to be steeper or flatter than VLL and VHH. Even when the slopes of 
all three indifference curves are the same, the result holds, given that the slope of the zero-profit 
line ZPP is different. In this case one can find another pooling contract close to the original zero-
profit pooling contract which is preferred by the couples of all three types and produces a non-
negative profit. Only if a point on ZPP exists in which the slopes of ZPP, VLL, VLH and VHH are 
identical this represents a pooling equilibrium. Clearly, this can occur only for very specific 
parameter constellations. Further, one cannot exclude the possibility that a pooling equilibrium 
exists, in case that the slope of VLH is either steeper or flatter than the slope of VLL and VHH. In 
this case, it can occur that any contract, close to the original zero-profit pooling contract, which 
is preferred either by couple HH or by couple LL, produces a negative profit, as it will be chosen 
                                                       
18   Obviously, all arguments remain valid, when considering a zero-profit pooling contract which is chosen 
only by couples of type LL and HH (but not by couple LH). Analogous arguments apply for any zero-
profit pooling contract which is chosen by two types of couples only (i.e. either by couples LH and LL or 
couples LH and HH): For any payoff-ratio one can find another contract close to the original pooling 
contract, which is preferred by one type of couples only and then produces a nonnegative profit (which 
follows from Lemma 5 and the single-crossing property (33)). Therefore, as we note already at this 
stage of analysis, there cannot exist an equilibrium which consists of one pooling contract, chosen by 
two types of couples, and one separate contract for the remaining type of couple. This will be 
discussed in detail in Section 3.3.2.    23
also by couple LH. If this is the case, then the original zero-profit contract constitutes a pooling 
equilibrium.  
 
3.3.2 Separating equilibrium with mandatory joint-life annuities for couples  
In this section we will show the possibility of a separating equilibrium for joint-life annuities in a 
framework in which couples are mandated to buy joint-life annuities. Under this assumption 
individual-life annuities are bought by single persons only, who receive a pooling contract  S q   
defined as in (20). In Section 3.3.3 we relax the assumption of mandatory joint-life annuities for 
couples and allow couples to choose between individual- and joint-life annuities. 
 
We call a set of three contracts (rLL,kLL), (rLH,kLH), (rHH,kHH) a separating Nash-Cournot 
equilibrium, if each fulfils the respective zero-profit condition (28) and the self-selection 
constraint for the respective couple ij = LL,LH,HH, i.e.  
 
  HH HH HH HH LH LH V( r, k)V( r, k) ≥ , (34a)  HH HH HH HH LL LL V( r, k)V( r , k) ≥ , (34b) 
  LH LH LH LH HH HH V( r, k) V( r, k ) ≥ , (35a)  LH LH LH LH LL LL V( r, k) V( r, k) ≥ , (35b) 
  LL LL LL LL LH LH V( r, k) V( r, k ) ≥ ,   (36a)  LL LL LL LL HH HH V( r, k) V( r, k ) ≥ , (36b) 
 
and if no other contract exists, which is preferred by at least one couple ij ∈ {LL,LH,HH} and 
which allows a nonnegative profit. Note that this definition of a separating equilibrium implies 
that if a couple of type ij is indifferent between their separate contract and another one (or two), 
they indeed choose the separate contract which is designed for them. Moreover, it is assumed 
that each couple of type ij is restricted to buy only one type of contract, i.e. no mix of (rLL,kLL), 
(rLH,kLH) and (rHH,kHH).
19 However, couples may purchase as many contracts of the chosen type 
as they want. Further, we refer to a logarithmic per-period function (14), which has two 
convenient properties helping to keep the analytical and graphical analysis simple: First, the 
single-crossing condition (33) is fulfilled, as mentioned above. Second, the demand for joint-life 
annuities does not depend on the payoffs (r,k) and on the parameter σ for the degree of joint 
consumption.  
 
Let the three contracts  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ),  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  be defined as follows: 
-  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) is the most preferred separate contract for couple HH, which fulfils the zero-profit 
condition (28) for couple HH; therefore  HH HH ˆ ˆ r2 k = , as shown in Lemma 4. 
                                                       
19  Note that this assumption is usually made in this type of asymmetric-information models, see e.g. 
Brunner and Pech (2005), Townley and Boadway (1988). Further, it is related to the analogous 
assumption needed to model price and quanitity competition, as applied by Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976) and Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled (1985) in the context of life annuities. There, individuals 
are restricted to buy only one insurance contract, which specifies a quantity and a price. Thus the 
assumption of excluding couples from buying a mix of contract types is less demanding; in reality, 
however, it requires a system of information exchange among annuity companies.    24
-  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) is implicitly defined by the zero-profit condition (28) for couple LH, by the property 
that a couple HH is indifferent between  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and by  LH LH ˆ ˆ r2 k < . 
-  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  is implicitly defined by the zero-profit condition (28) for couple LL, by the property 
that a couple LH is indifferent between  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  and by  LL LL ˆ ˆ r2 k < . 
 
In the following we will show that the set of these three contracts may but need not constitute an 
equilibrium. We begin the analysis by illustrating graphically how the three contracts are 
defined. In Figure 3, analogously to Figure 1, we have drawn the zero-profit lines ZPij for a 
separate contract (rij,kij) and their respective points of intersection S1 and S2. Note that in order 
to simplify the graphics we now assume a value of πL < 0.5, hence in Figure 3 ZPLL and ZPLH do 
not cross. Given logarithmic utility, the indifference curves Vij are strictly convex, with respective 
slope  ( ) ij i j j i 2k ( ( 1 ) ( 1) ) r − ππ π −π +π −π ; the respective slope of ZPij is equal to 
( ) ij i j j i (1 ) (1 ) −ππ π −π +π −π . Hence, at  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) the indifference curve VHH is tangent to the 
zero-profit line ZPHH, while the indifferences curves, VHH going through  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and VLH going 
through  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ), have exactly two points of intersection with the zero-profit line ZPLH, ZPLL 
resp.  LH LH ˆ ˆ r2 k <  and  LL LL ˆ ˆ r2 k <  uniquely define the respective points of intersection above the 
straight line S' where r = 2k.  
 
Figure 3: The possibility of a separating equilibrium 
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By definition,  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ),  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  produce zero profits, if each is chosen only by 
the respective couple ij = LL,LH,HH. That this is indeed the case is shown in the next Lemma.   
 
Lemma 7:  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ),  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  fulfil the self-selection constraints (34a) – (36b). 
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Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
The self-selection constraint (34a) for couple HH is fulfilled by the condition that 
HH HH HH HH LH LH ˆˆ ˆˆ V( r, k)V( r, k) = . Further it turns out that the self-selection constraint (34b) holds as 
well, which is due to the single-crossing condition: It is evident from Figure 3 that couples of 
type HH are better off at  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) than at the separate  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  for couple LL. Altogether, 
couples of type HH buy their separate contract  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ). Equivalent considerations apply to 
couples of type LH: They choose the contract  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ), as, by definition, 
LH LH LH LH LL LL ˆˆ ˆˆ V( r, k) V( r, k) = , and as, due to the single-crossing condition, 
LH LH LH LH HH HH ˆˆ ˆˆ V( r, k) V( r, k ) > . Finally observe from Figure 3 that (again due to the single-crossing 
condition) couples of type LL prefer their contract  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  to the other two contracts, designed 
for couples of type LH and HH; hence the self-selection constraints (36a) and (36b) hold with 
inequality. 
 
Lemma 7 ensures that no couple of type ij has an incentive to deviate from their respective 
separate contract, if only  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ),  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  are offered to them, which in turn 
imply zero profits for the annuity companies. Next, we will show that annuity companies have no 
incentive to offer any other separate contract than  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ),  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  to the 
respective couple ij = LL,LH,HH. As a preparation we show:  
 
Lemma 8: Any separate contract which fulfils the zero-profit condition (28)  
(i)  for couple LH and which is preferred to  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) by couple LH, would be chosen also 
by couple HH and then produce a loss.  
(ii)  for couple LL and which is preferred to  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  by couple LL, would be also chosen by 
couple LH or by couple LH and HH and then produce a loss.  
 
Proof: See the Appendix.  
 
The arguments behind (i) of Lemma 8 are the following: First observe that  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) as the point 
of intersection of VHH and ZPLH must lie below the point of intersection of ZHH and ZPLH, which is 
due to the fact that at  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) the slope of VHH is steeper than ZPHH. Consequently,  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) 
as well as any contract on ZPLH below  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) are characterised by a payoff-ratio below S1 
where ZPLH lies above ZPHH (compare Corollary 2). Second, observe that couple LH and HH 
prefer any contract on ZPLH below  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) to their respective separate contract  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and 
HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ), while couple LL is better off at  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  (note the single-crossing property of Vij). 
Hence, any such contract would produce a loss, if it were offered by the annuity companies (as 
it would be chosen also by couple HH). By analogous consideration we find that  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  is 
characterised by a payoff-ratio, where ZPLL lies above ZPLH, and that the contract, at which VHH   26
and ZPLH cross, denoted as D in Figure 3, is characterised by a payoff-ratio below S2, where 
ZPLL lies above ZPHH. Hence, any contract on ZPLL which is preferred to  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  by couple LL 
would produce a loss, because it would be chosen also by couple LH or by couple LH and HH.  
 
Proposition 3: If a separating equilibrium exists, it consists of  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ),  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and 
LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) .  
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
As an intuition for this result, note first that  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ), which is most preferred by couple HH 
among all contracts on ZPHH, must be part of the equilibrium: Any other contract is dominated by 
HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ), and firms need not care whether couples of type LH and/or LL might buy this contract 
too, because this would only increase profits (as  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) lies below S1). However, when 
offering a specific contract to couple LH, annuity companies have to be concerned that this 
contract is not chosen by a couple of type HH, because then they would make a loss, as 
Lemma 8 tells us. This implies that the self-selection constraint (34a) is essential: Among all 
contracts on ZPLH, only  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ), which is the most preferred by couple LH, subject to the self-
selection constraint (34a), can be part of a separating equilibrium. Note, in particular that due to 
this argument the contract 
bb
LH LH (r ,k ), which is most preferred by couple LH among all contracts 
on ZPLH cannot be part of the equilibrium. However, annuity companies need not to care 
whether couples of type LL buy  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ), because this would imply positive profits. Analogous 
considerations apply to the separate contract for couple LL, where only  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) , which 
provides the maximum utility to couple LL subject to the self-selection constraint (35b), can be 
part of the separating equilibrium. Any other contract on ZPLL, at which couple LL would be 
better off than at  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) , would be chosen by couple LH and/or couple HH and then produce 
a loss (compare Lemma 8), and hence, will not be offered by the annuity companies.  
 
Proposition 3 says that the contract set  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ),  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  is indeed the only 
candidate for a separating equilibrium: No other separate contract (rij,kij) exists which is 
preferred by the respective couple ij = LL,LH,HH only, and produces a nonnegative profit. 
However, to prove that this contract set indeed constitutes an equilibrium, one has to show that 
no other contract exists, which is preferred by at least two couples ij ∈ {LL,LH,HH} and which 
allows a nonnegative profit.  
 
Proposition 4: For sufficiently high values γ of the share of the high-risk types, a separating 
equilibrium exists. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix.   27
We demonstrate the intuition behind this Proposition graphically by means of Figure 4. First, 
consider a contract, which lies above the indifference curves VLL, VLH and VHH, such as E in 
Figure 4. If E is offered, couples of all three types will purchase it. If moreover E allows a non-
negative profit, when bought by couples of all three types, it will be offered by the annuity 
companies, and consequently it will upset the potential separating equilibrium  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ), 
LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) . We note that the profitability of E and hence the position of the dashed 
zero-profit line ZPP1
20, which represents all pooling contracts which fulfil the zero-profit condition 
with positive annuity demand Aij > 0 for ij = LL,LH,HH, depends on the composition of aggregate 
annuity demand. If there are relatively many married persons with a high survival probability, i.e 
a high value of γ, then E will lose money. Such a case is drawn in Figure 4, where ZPP1 does not 
cross VLL; hence no pooling contract exists, which is chosen by couples of all three types and 
allows a non-negative profit. However, for lower values γ of high-risk types, ZPP1 lies closer to 
ZPLL, if E lies on or below ZPP1, E will make a profit and no separating equilibrium exists.   
 
Figure 4: The existence of a separating equilibrium 
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Second, consider a contract which lies above the indifference curves VLH and VHH, but below 
VLL, like contract F in Figure 4. If F is offered, it is purchased by couples of type LH and HH, but 
not by couples of type LL. As above, the profitability of F and hence the position of the zero-
profit line ZPP2 for a pooling contract with AHH > 0, ALH > 0, ALL = 0, depends on the level of the 
share γ of the high-risk types. For sufficiently large values of γ, ZPP2 lies below VLH. Such a 
situation is presented in Figure 4, which implies that any pooling contract, preferred by couple 
LH and HH, would produce negative profits and thus, will not be offered by the annuity 
                                                       
20  Note that in case of logarithmic per-period utility the zero-profit conditions for a pooling contract is 
indeed a straight line, as annuity demand Aij does not depend on (r,k).    28
companies. However, for sufficiently low values of γ, F makes a non-negative profit, when 
bought by couples of type LH and HH, (which means that F will lie on or below ZPP2), and 
consequently the contract set  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ),  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  does not constitute a 
separating equilibrium. Analogous arguments apply to a contract like G, which lies above VLH 
and VLL but below VHH, and hence would be chosen by couples of type LH and LL, but not by 
couple HH. If G lies on or below the zero-profit line ZPP3, which represents all pooling contracts 
which fulfil the zero-profit condition with ALH > 0, ALL > 0, AHH = 0, no separating equilibrium 
exists. However, for a sufficiently large γ, as drawn in Figure 4, ZPP3 lies below VLL; hence no 
dominating pooling contract, which allow non-negative profits, exists. Finally note that there 
does not exist a contract, which – due to the single-crossing condition – lies above VLL and VHH, 
but below VLH. Altogether, we can conclude that for sufficiently large shares γ of high-risk types, 
no pooling contract exists, which is chosen by at least two types of couples, and then produces 
a non-negative profit. Such a situation is drawn in Figure 4. In this case  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ),  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and 
LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  indeed constitute a separating equilibrium.  
 
However, for lower shares γ, where at least one pooling contract like E, F or G allows a non-
negative profit, no separating equilibrium exists.
 21 In case that E allows non-negative profits, E 
does not constitute an equilibrium either, as we know from Proposition 2. From this it follows 
that the market for joint-life annuities will have no equilibrium at all. Due to analogous 
arguments, there cannot exist an equilibrium which consists of a contract set with one pooling 
contract for couples of two different types and one separate contract for the couple of the 
remaining type, like F and  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  or G and  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ): For this note first that any contract F 
which is preferred by couples of type LH and HH to their separate contracts must lie below S1, 
where ZPLH lies above ZPHH (immediate from similar arguments as used to prove Lemma 8). 
Thus in case that there exists a contract F, which lies on the zero-profit line ZPP2, annuity 
companies can offer another contract close to F, which is preferred by couples of type LH only, 
and then produces a positive profit (compare Lemma 5). Thus, a zero-profit pooling contract F 
cannot be part of an equilibrium, and due to similar considerations, also a zero-profit pooling 
contract G cannot be part of an equilibrium either.  
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the basic arguments remain valid in case of a general per-
period utility function, not just for a logarithmic one, as long as the single-crossing condition 
holds. It is straightforward to see that the zero-profit lines ZPij for separate contracts for couples 
of each type, are unaffected by the type of the utility function. Hence the characterization of the 
                                                       
21   We ran numerical simulations which show that for sufficiently low γ, at which a pooling contract G 
allows non-negative profits, also the pooling contracts E and F allow non-negative profits. On the 
other hand, for higher shares γ, only a pooling contract F produces non-negative profits, while the 
contracts G and E do not.  
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separating equilibrium remains valid. The main difference is that with a general utility function, 
the curves ZPP1, ZPP2 and ZPP3, defined by the zero-profit condition (30) for pooling contracts, 
will no longer be a straight line, because annuity demand depends on the payoff rates. The 
shape of these zero-profit curves in turn has an influence on the existence of the equilibrium. 
 
Altogether, we can conclude that in case that couples are mandated to buy joint-life annuities, 
only a separating equilibrium can exist, where couples with both partners having a high survival 
probability can buy their "first-best" contract with a payoff-ratio r/k = 2, while couples of the other 
types (with at least one partner having a low survival probability) can only buy a "distorted" 
contract with a lower payoff-ratio r/k. This result fits to the empirical observation that annuity 
companies offer joint-life annuities which differ in their payoff-fraction. For instance, TIAA-CREF 
offers joint-life annuities with a payoff ratio r/k of 2, 1.5 and 1 (see Amerik, 2002). The results 
found in this framework suggest that these different options are offered by the annuity 
companies in order to select couples according to the partners' life-expectancies.  
 
However, among those TIAA-CREF participants, who bought a joint-life annuity, about two-
thirds of women and men chose that option with the lowest payoff-ratio of one (Ameriks, 2002). 
In the framework with mandatory joint-life annuities for all couples, this means that the share γ 
of high-risk types is relatively low, which in turn would imply that the existence of a separating 
equilibrium is less likely. However, in reality, couples are free to choose between individual-life 
annuities and joint-life annuities. Accounting for this fact, a plausible explanation for the high 
majority of the lowest payoff-ratio r/k = 1 among those selecting joint-life annuities can be 
offered: Mainly couples with partners having a low survival probability indeed choose joint-life 
annuities, while couples with partners expecting a longer life rather decide for individual-life 
annuities. The next Section 3.3.3, where free choice between individual- and joint-life annuities 
is considered, investigates whether this guess turns out to be correct.  
 
3.3.3 Equilibria with free choice between individual or joint-life annuities 
In the presence of mandatory joint-life annuities for couples, only single persons of either type i 
= L,H buy individual-life annuities, which are offered to them at an equilibrium rate of return  S q  , 
as defined by (20) in Section 2.2. In this section we extend the analysis of equilibria by allowing 
couples to choose between individual- and joint-life annuities within the same framework as 
above. Specifically, note that maintaining the assumption about restricting individuals to the 
purchase of one contract-type, now also excludes the purchase of a mix between contracts for 
individual-life annuities and for joint-life annuities (which will be abbreviated by IA- and JA-
contracts from now on). However, as above, individuals (regardless of whether married or 
single) may purchase any amount of the chosen contract-type as they want. First of all note that   30
this, together with the above considerations concerning the characterisation and existence of 
equilibria for both contract-types, implies that IA-contracts, traded in equilibrium, continue to be 
pooling contracts, which are bought at least by the single persons i = L,H. On the other hand, if 
JA-contracts are traded in equilibrium, then they continue to be separate contracts, designed for 
the respective couple ij.  
 
The second important observation, relevant for the analysis of equilibria in this extended 
framework, is that couples of type HH prefer any zero-profit pooling contract for individual-life 
annuities to any zero-profit separate contract for joint-life annuities. The reason for this result is 
that with the former contract-type, couples of type HH are in a pool with low-risk individuals (at 
least with those being unmarried), hence it can offer higher expected payoffs than the latter 
contract-type, which payoffs are determined according to the high survival probability of both 
couple members. Specifically, recall that the most preferred zero-profit separate contract 
HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) for couple HH is given by ( ) HH 1, 1 ( 2) ππ , while a zero-profit IA-contract provides a 
payoff q >  H 1 π . This together with the fact, explored in Corollary 1, that couples of type HH are 
better off with individual-life annuities than with joint-life annuities specified according to the "half 
to last survivor" rule r/k = 2, if q > r, explains the next Lemma. 
 
Lemma 9: Couple HH prefers any pooling contract q for individual-life annuities, which, together 
with annuity demand  i B(q ) 0 >  and 
i
ij B( q ) 0 ≥  for i,j = L,H, fulfils the zero-profit condition (19), to 
their most preferred separate contract  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) which fulfils the zero-profit condition (28) for 
couple HH.  
 
Proof: Immediate by use of Lemma 3, Corollary 1, Lemma 4 and the fact, explored in Section 
2.2, that any zero-profit pooling contract q must lie between  H 1 π  and  L 1 π .   Q.E.D. 
 
It follows from Lemma 9 that in equilibrium no separate JA-contract (rHH,kHH) for couple HH will 
be traded. The third important observation is that it is ambiguous whether couples of type LH 
are better off with a zero-profit pooling contract q for individual-life annuities or with a zero-profit 
separate contract (rLH,kLH) for joint-life annuities. For this note that the zero-profit pooling 
contract q may but need not offer a higher expected payoff than a zero-profit separate contract 
for couple LH, as the latter depends on πL and πH only, while the former depends additionally on 
the share γ of the high-risk types (and on the share β of single persons). The lower γ, the higher 
is q, which makes it less likely that couples LH prefer any zero-profit separate contract (rLH, kLH) 
to the zero-profit pooling contract q.  
 
These observations give us a first intuition for the results shown in the following. We identify two 
different types of equilibria, denoted by E1 and E2: If γ is sufficiently high for any given β and πi,   31
i = L,H, an E1 equilibrium may exist where couples of type HH, together with the single persons, 
buy a pooling contract for individual-life annuities and couples of type LH and LL buy a separate 
contract for joint-life annuities. Otherwise, an E2 equilibrium may exist where also couples of 
type LH (together with the single persons and couples HH) buy the pooling contract for 
individual-life annuities and only couples of type LL buy their separate contract for joint-life 
annuities.  
 
Our analysis of possible equilibria proceeds along the same lines as before, where we first 
investigate the existence and characterisation of the E1 equilibrium, before we turn to the 
analysis of the E2 equilibrium. We call a set of three contracts q, (rLH,kLH), (rLL,kLL) an E1 
equilibrium, if the pooling contract q for individual-life annuities together with annuity demand 
H B( q ) 0 > ,  L B( q ) 0 > , 
H
HH B( q )0 >  and 
H
LH B( q )0 = , 
L
LH B( q )0 = , 
L
LL B( q )0 = , fulfils the zero-profit 
condition (19), and each of the separate contracts (rLH,kLH) and (rLL,kLL) fulfils the respective 
zero-profit condition (28), if each contract fulfils the self-selection constraints for the respective 
couple ij = LL,LH,HH, i.e.  
 
  HH HH LH LH V( q )V( r, k) ≥ , (37a)  HH HH LL LL V( q )V( r , k) ≥ , (37b) 
  LH LH LH LH V( r, k) V( q ) ≥ , (38a)  LH LH LH LH LL LL V( r, k) V( r, k) ≥ , (38b) 
  LL LL LL LL LH LH V( r, k) V( r, k ) ≥ ,   (39a)  LL LL LL LL V( r, k) V( q ) ≥ , (39b) 
 
and if no other contract q or (r,k) exists, which if preferred to by at least one couple ij ∈ 
{LL,LH,HH} and which allows a nonnegative profit.  
 
Let  q denote the zero-profit pooling contract for individual-life annuities, as defined for an E1 
equilibrium
22, and note that due to Corollary 1 the mixed risk-couple LH is better off at q than at 
any JA-contract (r,k) with r = 2k, if q = r. From this it follows that the self-selection constraint 
(38a) cannot be fulfilled, if q ≥ 
b
LH r , where 
bb
LH LH (r ,k ) indicates the zero-profit separate contract, 
which is most preferred by couple LH, with 
bb
LH LH r2 k = . Hence, an E1 equilibrium can only exists, 
if  q < 
b
LH r . In that case the other two parts of a potential E1 equilibrium, denoted by  LH LH (r ,k ) 
and  LL LL (r ,k ), have the following properties:  
-  LH LH (r ,k ) is implicitly defined by the zero-profit condition (28) for couple LH, by the property 
that a couple HH is indifferent between q and  LH LH (r ,k ) and by  LH LH r2 k < .  
-  LL LL (r ,k ) is implicitly defined by the zero-profit condition (28) for couple LL, by the property 
that a couple LH is indifferent between  LH LH (r ,k ) and  LL LL (r ,k ) and by  LL LL r2 k < .  
 
                                                       
22  Note that in case of logarithmic utility (14) the profit function (18) is strictly decreasing in q, which 
implies that there exists a unique root of the zero-profit condition (19).    32
Obviously, the definition of  LH LH (r ,k ) and  LL LL (r ,k ) imply that the self-selection constraints (37a) 
and (38b) are fulfilled with equality, which is illustrated in Figure 5 which replicates Figure 3 for 
the case where couples are free to choose between IA- and JS-contracts. In Figure 5 the 
indifference curve  HH V  of couple HH represents all contracts (r,k) at which couple HH is as well 
off as at the pooling IA-contract q. Because couple HH is indifferent between q and any JS-
contract with r = 2k =q (as mentioned above and explored in Corollary 1), the intersection of 
HH V  with the straight line S' (where r = 2k) shows the level of q. As in Figure 3,  HH V  has 
exactly two points of intersection with the zero-profit line ZPLH;  LH LH r2 k <  uniquely defines the 
respective point of intersection above S'. In the same way,  LL LL (r ,k ) is found as the point of 
intersection of ZPLL and  LH V , going through  LH LH (r ,k ), above S'.  
 
Figure 5: The possibility of an E1 equilibrium (q,  LH LH (r ,k ),  LL LL (r ,k )) 
r
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Due to the single-crossing property of the indifference curves the self-selection constraint (37b) 
for couple HH and the self-selection constraints (39a) and (39b) for couple LL (note that  LL V  
going through  LL LL (r ,k )  lies above the contract with r = q)
23 hold with inequality. However, it 
depends on the constellations of the parameters πH,  πL,  γ and β whether the self-selection 
constraint (38a) is fulfilled. Because a JS-contract with r = 2k does not allow to adapt 
consumption according to the relatively higher chance that only partner H survives than that 
only partner L survives (as mentioned above and explored in Corollary 1), a couple LH needs a 
JS-contract with r = 2k > q in order to be indifferent to q, which means that the dashed 
indifference curve  LH V′ , which represents all contracts (r,k) at which couple LH is as well off as 
                                                       
23  Obviously, the indifference curve for the same-risk couple LL (as for the same-risk couple HH) which 
represents all contracts (r,k) at which they are as well off as at the pooling IA-contract  q , must go 
through the point on S' where r =  q .   33
at  q, must lie above q. Only if  LH V′  lies below the indifference curve  LH V  (or coincide with 
LH V ), which goes through  LH LH (r ,k ), the self-selection constraint (38a) holds. Such a case is 
drawn in Figure 5, which is found for appropriate parameter constellations.   
 
Further, it follows from analogous arguments as in the Proof of Lemma 8, together with the fact 
that  HH V  lies above ZPHH (and thus above VHH going through  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) in Figure 3),  LH LH (r ,k ) is 
characterised by a payoff-ratio below S1, at which ZPLH lies above ZPHH, that  LL LL (r ,k ) is 
characterised by a payoff-ratio, at which ZPLL lies above ZPLH, and D' is characterised by a 
payoff-ratio below S2, at which ZPLL lies above ZPHH. This implies that, as for the separating 
equilibrium with mandated joint-life annuities for couples, the self-selection constraints (37a) 
and (38b) are essential: Annuity companies have to care that  LH LH (r ,k ) is not chosen by couple 
HH as well as that  LL LL (r ,k ) is not chosen by couple LH and/or by couple HH, because in either 
case they would make a loss. Thus, any separate contract on ZPLH above  LH V  as well as any 
separate contract on ZPLL above  LL V  cannot be part of an E1 equilibrium. On the other hand, all 
other contracts on ZPLH, ZPLL, resp. are dominated by  LH LH (r ,k ),  LL LL (r ,k ), resp., and, hence, 
cannot be part of the equilibrium either. Moreover, it follows from Lemma 9 that no separate 
contract for couple HH can be part of the E1 equilibrium, which is obvious also from Figure 5; 
there  HH V  lies above ZPHH. From these considerations we can conclude that no other separate 
contract exists which is preferred by a couple ij = LL,LH,HH and then allows a non-negative 
profit. Therefore, if an E1 equilibrium exists, it consists of q,  LH LH (r ,k ) and  LL LL (r ,k ).  
 
However, this contract set does not constitute an equilibrium, if the self-selection constraint 
(38a) is not fulfilled, i.e. if  LH LH LH LH V( r, k ) V( q ) < . Moreover, the potential E1 equilibrium may be 
upset by (i) a pooling IA-contract q, which is preferred also by couple LH and/or by couple LL, 
and produces a non-negative profit, and/or by (ii) a pooling JS-contract (r,k), which is preferred 
by at least two couple ij ∈ {LL,LH,HH} and which produces a non-negative profit. Only if neither 
of these pooling contracts exists and if condition (38a) holds, then q,  LH LH (r ,k ) and  LL LL (r ,k ) 
indeed constitute an equilibrium.  
 
For (i) note first that the share of individual-life annuities bought by low-risk individuals (in 
aggregate demand for IA) increases, if couples of type LL would buy individual-life annuities 
instead of their separate JA-contract  LL LL (r ,k ). Hence, any contract, which is bought 
additionally by couple LL, must offer a payoff larger than q in order to restore zero profits. This 
means that q < q′  with q′  denoting the root of the zero-profit condition (19) with positive 
annuity demand of all types of single and married persons except of those of couples LH. It 
follows that  LL LL LL LL V( r, k) V( q ) >  does not exclude the possibility that  LL LL LL LL V( r, k) V( q ) ′ < . 
Analogous considerations apply for a pooling contract q, which together with positive annuity   34
demand of single persons of both types i = L,H,
24 as well as of couples of type HH and LH, fulfils 
the zero-profit condition (19) and for a pooling contract q  , which together with positive annuity 
demand of all types of single and married persons, fulfils (19). We test for the very existence of 
an E1 equilibrium by numerical calculations, which are summarised in Table 1.
25 These 
computations for parameter constellations of πL, πH, β and γ, where all of the four parameters 
vary from 0.8, 0.6, 0.4 to 0.2, show the following: For those parameter constellations, at which 
the self-selection constraint (38a) for couple LH holds, couple LH prefers also  LH LH (r ,k ) to q 
and couple LL prefers  LL LL (r ,k ) to q′  and q  . Hence, no other pooling contract q exists, which is 
chosen by couple LH and/or couple LL, and produces a non-negative profit.  
 
For (ii) the same considerations as in Section 3.3.2 apply where couples are assumed to be 
mandated to buy joint-life annuities: One has to show whether a contract E, as drawn in Figure 
4, which lies above  HH V ,  LH V  and  LL V , a contract F (above  HH V  and  LH V , but below  LL V ) and 
a contract G (above  LH V  and  LL V , but below  HH V ), allows non-negative profits. If such a 
contract exists, it upsets the potential equilibrium q,  LH LH (r ,k ),  LL LL (r ,k ). However note that q, 
LH LH (r ,k ),  LL LL (r ,k ) can constitute an equilibrium only, if the self-selection constraint (38a) 
holds. As argued above, (38a) holds for a sufficiently large share γ of high-risk types only. 
However, a large share γ makes it less likely that any pooling contract like E, F and/or G 
produces a non-negative profit (compare Proposition 4). This correlation is also reflected in the 
numerical simulations: For those parameter constellations, for which the self-selection constraint 
(38a) holds, no dominating zero-profit pooling contract (r,k) exists, which would upset the 
potential E1 equilibrium. Altogether, one can conclude that for sufficiently great shares γ of high-
risk types the self-selection constraint (38a) holds. Then an E1 equilibrium exists, indicated by 
"E1" in Table 1. 
 
However, what we did find indeed are parameter constellations, at which q < 
b
LH r  and the self-
selection constraint (38a) is not fulfilled, i.e.  LH LH LH LH V( r, k ) V( q ) <  indicated by *) in Table 1.
26 
For these, as explored above, no E1 equilibrium exists and two cases have to be distinguished: 
If  LH LH LH LH V( r, k ) V( q ) < , then, obviously, there exists a pooling contract for individual-life 
annuities which is preferred also by couple LH and produces zero-profits, which imply that an 
E2 equilibrium may exist. However, if  LH LH LH LH V( q ) V( r, k ) ≤ , then no such IA-contract exists. It 
follows that neither an E1 nor an E2 equilibrium exists: Such a situation is found for some 
parameter constellations and is denoted in Table 1 by NE*).  
                                                       
24   Note however that  q <
> _
q , as in case that couple LH (with one low-risk and one high-risk partner) 
additionally would buy the pooling IA-contract, the share of individual life annuities bought by low-risk 
individuals (in aggregate demand for IA) may increase or decrease.  
25   Detailed calculations are provided on request.  
26  Remember that, if q ≥ 
b
LH r , (38a) cannot be fulfilled (as it was argued at the beginning of Section 
3.3.3).    35
Table 1:   The (non-)existence of an E1- and of an E2-equilibrium  
  Numerical calculations for logarithmic utility with ω = 100 
 
  πH = 0.8, πL= 0.6  πH = 0.8, πL= 0.4 
  γ = 0.8  γ = 0.6  γ = 0.4  γ = 0.2  γ = 0.8  γ = 0.6  γ = 0.4  γ = 0.2 
β = 0.8   E1   E1   E2     E2   E1   E2  *)  E2  *)  E2 
β = 0.6   E1   E1   E2  *)  E2   E1   E1   E2  *)  E2 
β = 0.4   E1   E1   E2  *)  E2   E1   E1   E2  *)  E2 
β = 0.2   E1   E1   E1   NE**)  E1   E1   NE*)   E2 
 
  πH = 0.6, πL= 0.4  πH = 0.6, πL= 0.2 
  γ = 0.8  γ = 0.6  γ = 0.4  γ = 0.2  γ = 0.8  γ = 0.6  γ = 0.4  γ = 0.2 
β = 0.8   E1   E1   E2   E2   E1   E1   E2  *)  E2 
β = 0.6   E1   E1   E2  *)  E2   E1   E1   E2  *)  E2 
β = 0.4   E1   E1   NE*)   E2   E1   E1   NE*)   E2 
β = 0.2   E1   E1   E1   NE**)  E1   E1   E1   E2  *) 
 
  πH = 0.4, πL= 0.2  πH = 0.8, πL= 0.2 
  γ = 0.8  γ = 0.6  γ = 0.4  γ = 0.2  γ = 0.8  γ = 0.6  γ = 0.4  γ = 0.2 
β = 0.8   E1   E1   E2  *)  E2   E1   E2  *)  E2  *)  E2 
β = 0.6   E1   E1   E2  *)  E2   E1   NE*)   E2  *)  E2 
β = 0.4   E1   E1   NE*)   E2   E1   E1   E2  *)  E2 
β = 0.2   E1   E1   E1   NE**)  E1   E1   NE*)   E2  *) 
  E1:  existence of an E1 equilibrium  *)   LH LH LH LH V( r, k ) V( q ) <   
  E2:  existence of an E2 equilbrium  NE*)   LH LH LH LH LH V( q ) V( r, k ) V( q ) <<  
       NE**)  zero-profit pooling contract (r,k) exists, which 
        is preferred by couples of all three types. 
 
Next, we concentrate our attention on the characterisation and existence of an E2 equilibrium. A 
contract set consisting of q and (rLL,kLL) constitute an E2 equilbrium, if the pooling contract q for 
individual-life annuities, together with annuity demand  H B( q ) 0 > ,  L B( q ) 0 > , 
H
HH B( q )0 > , 
H
LH B( q )0 > , 
L
LH B( q )0 > , 
L
LL B( q )0 = , fulfils the zero-profit condition (19), and the separate 
contract (rLL,kLL) fulfils the zero-profit condition (28) for ij = LL, if each contract fulfils the self-
selection constraint for the respective couple ij = LL,LH,HH, i.e.  
 
  HH HH LL LL V( q )V( r , k) ≥ , (40) 
  LH LH LL LL V( q ) V( r, k) ≥ , (41) 
  LL LL LL LL V( r, k) V( q ) ≥ , (42) 
 
and if no other contract q or (r,k) exists, which if preferred to by at least one couple ij ∈ 
{LL,LH,HH} and which allows a nonnegative profit.  
 
Obviously,  q must be one part of the potential E2 equilibrium, however we have to distinguish 
between two cases, depending on the constellations of parameters, how the second part of the   36
E2 equilibrium, the separate contract (rLL, kLL) for couple LL, is defined. We demonstrate this via 
geometric arguments: In both Figures 6a and 6b, the indifference curve  HH V  represents all 
contracts (r,k) at which couple HH is as well off as with the pooling contract q. In the same way 
LH V  represents all contracts (r,k) at which couple LH is as well off as with q (as above, we 
know that  HH V  goes through the point where r = 2k = q, while  LH V  has to lie above r = 2k = q). 
Observe first that in Figure 6a,  HH V  and  LH V  intersect below ZPLL. Hence, only the contract 
LL LL (r ,k ), which is implicitly defined by the zero-profit condition (28) for couple LL, by the 
property that a couple LH is indifferent between q and  LL LL (r ,k ) and by  LL LL r2 k < , can 
constitute, together with q, the potential E2 equilibrium. In that case the self-selection constraint 
(41) holds with equality and (40) holds with inequality. However note that γ may be that small 
and hence q may be that large that  HH V  and  LH V  intersect above ZPLL, as illustrated 
graphically in Figure 6b. In that case the second part of the potential E2 equilibrium, denoted by 
LL LL (r ,k ) ′′, is found as the point of intersection of  HH V  and ZPLL above the straight line S'.
27 
There (40) holds with equality and (41) holds with inequality. However irrespective of whether 
LL LL (r ,k ) or  LL LL (r ,k ) ′′ is part of the potential equilibrium, in either case the self-selection 
constraint (42) is fulfilled due to the single-crossing property of the indifference curves.  
 
Figure 6: The possibility of an E2 equilibrium 
 Fig.  6a:  q,  LL LL (r ,k ) Fig.  6b:  q,  LL LL (r ,k ) ′′  
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Due to equivalent arguments as explored above, given a potential E2 equilibrium no other 
separate contract (rij,kij) exists, which is preferred by the respective couple ij and produces a 
non-negative profit: First, as in both Figures 6a and 6b,  HH V  lies above ZPHH and  LH V  lies 
above ZPLH, any separate contract for couple LH and HH, which is preferred by the couple of 
                                                       
27   More formally,  LL LL (r ,k ) ′′  is implicitly defined by the zero-profit condition (28) for couple LL, by the 
property that a couple HH is indifferent between  q  and  LL LL (r ,k ) ′ ′  and by  LL LL r2 k ′ ′ < .    37
the respective type, would produce a loss. Second, any other contract on ZPLL than  LL LL (r ,k ), 
LL LL (r ,k ) ′′, resp., which is preferred by couple LL, would be chosen by couple LH and/or couple 
HH, and hence produce a loss. From this, we can conclude that, if an E2 equilibrium exists, it 
consists either of the contract set q,  LL LL (r ,k ) or of the contract set q, LL LL (r ,k ) ′ ′ .  
 
However, as above, no E2 equilibrium exists, if there exists (i) a pooling contract q, which is 
preferred also by couple LL and produces a non-negative profit, and/or (ii) a pooling contract 
(r,k), which if preferred to by at least two couple ij ∈ {LL,LH,HH} and which produces a non-
negative profit. In order to assess the prevalence of such dominating zero-profit pooling 
contracts, we refer to the numerical computations in Table 1, where we proceed along the same 
lines, as when testing the existence of an E1 equilibrium: (i) As q < q  , we check whether 
LL LL LL LL V( q ) V( r, k) ≤   or  LL LL LL LL V( q ) V( r, k) ′ ′ ≤  , resp. If the respective condition holds, a pooling 
contract q, which is preferred by couples LL and produces a non-negative profit, does not exist. 
The numerical calculations show that for those parameter constellations, for which we found a 
situation as drawn in Figure 6a or 6b, couple LL prefer their respective separate contract to q  . 
(ii) Note that for a potential E2 equilibrium to exist the share γ of high-risk types must be 
sufficiently low. Consequently, a JA-contract, which is preferred by at least two couples-types 
and produces a non-negative profit, is more likely to exist. Numerical calculations show that 
given πH - πL = 0.2, γ = 0.2 and β = 0.2, a pooling contract (r,k), like E in Figure 4, exists, which 
is preferred by couples of all three types and produces a nonnegative profit. Consequently, no 
E2 equilibrium exists, which is indicated by NE**) in Table 1. However, for all other parameter 
constellations with sufficiently low shares γ of high-risk types, any pooling contract which is 
chosen by at least two types of couples, produce negative profits. Therefore, an E2 equilibrium 
exists, which is indicated by "E2" in Table 1.  
 
Altogether, we can conclude that the equilibria found in this Section can serve as a plausible 
explanation for the empirical observation (mentioned at the end of Section 3.3.2) that two-thirds 
of TIAA-CREF participants, who purchased joint-life annuities, chose the contract that specifies 
the lowest payoff-ratio r/k = 1: Mainly couples with partners having a low survival probability 
choose their separate contract for joint-life annuities, while couples with at least one longer-lived 
partner rather decide for a pooling contract for individual-life annuities, because such a contract 
can offer them higher expected payoffs, as they are pooled with the short-lived single persons.  
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has demonstrated that the consumption behaviour of couples, who have agreed to 
pool resources, has important implications on the private annuity market. First, we have focused 
on the market for individual life annuities and have assumed the standard model of asymmetric   38
information with two periods of life and with price competition. We have shown that the influence 
of couples as market participants on the pooling equilibrium depends on how their annuity 
demand affects the overrepresentation of annuities bought by the individuals with a high life-
expectancy. We find that the extent of adverse selection is increased, in case that couples do 
not have the advantage of joint consumption of "family public goods" as well as in case of a 
logarithmic utility function. Then the equilibrium rate of return on individual-life annuities is 
smaller in an economy where couples and singles coexist compared to an economy with single 
persons only, otherwise the effect is ambiguous. As the majority of individuals are married or 
live in a long-term relationship, this result may contribute to explain the limited size of the private 
annuity market.  
 
Second, considering couples as the decision-making units allows us to model the market for 
joint-life annuities. Due to their higher chance that only one partner survives to the retirement, 
couples with partners having a low survival probability put more weight on the survivor benefit 
than a couple with partners having a higher life expectancy. We have shown that this provides 
an incentive for the annuity companies to offer different survivor benefit options in order to 
separate couples according to the partners' life expectancies. Hence, in a framework where 
couples are mandated to provide for retirement through joint-life annuities, only a separating 
equilibrium for joint-life annuities can exist. This result is taken as a benchmark, which is 
compared to the more relevant situation in which couples are free to choose between individual- 
and joint-life annuities. In this framework we identify two possible equilibria, which occurrence 
depends on the exogenous parameters: In the first equilibrium couples with two long-lived 
partners, together with the single persons, buy a pooling contract for individual-life annuities and 
couples with at least one short-lived partner buy their separate contracts for joint-life annuities. 
In the other equilibrium also mixed-risk couples buy the pooling contract for individual-life 
annuities and only couples with two short-lived partners buy their separate contract for joint-life 
annuities.  
 
These results can explain the empirical observations, already mentioned in the Introduction, that 
that couples choose indeed joint-life annuities with differing survivor benefit options and that a 
certain fraction of married annuitants indeed choose individual-life annuities. Further, in a recent 
empirical study, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) tested for selection effects in the U.K. annuity 
market, and they found systematic relationships between ex-post mortality and certain 
characteristics of contracts for individual-life annuities. Estimating a hazard model regarding the 
annuitants' life-spans, they found clear evidence that annuity contracts that provide higher 
payoffs in later years are selected by the longer-lived individuals; annuity contracts that specify 
payments to the annuitant's estate in the event of an early death are selected by shorter-lived 
individuals. These findings makes it plausible to assume that further annuitants' self-selection   39
may exist, namely those suggested by this paper: Couples with short-lived partners should 
choose joint-life annuities that offer a higher survivor benefit (relative to the payout in case that 
both partners survive) than couples with at least one longer-lived partner. Couples with partners 
having an even higher life-expectancy should choose individual-life annuities. To test for these 
selection effects appears to be an interesting task for future empirical research. 
 
Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 2:  
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which is positive. Hence BH(q) > BL(q). 
 
We denote the LHS of (12') by V
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Inverting the first matrix on the RHS of (A2) and multiplying yields: 
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, (A4) 
 
From the above inequalities and the RHS of (A3), (A4) resp., it follows that 
i
ij i B0 ∂∂ π > , while 
the sign of 
i
ij j B ∂∂ π  is ambiguous: 
i
ij j B0 ∂ ∂π < , if 
ji j
j ij i i xV B zV − ∂∂> − ∂∂ π  (which is 
equivalent to condition (17) in the text), where the LHS of this inequality is positive, while the 
RHS is indeterminate. Due to symmetry the same considerations apply to 
j
j ij B ∂∂ π  and 
j
i ij B ∂∂ π . Hence, 
LL
LH LL B (q) B (q) < and 
HH
HH LH B (q) B (q) < , if condition (17) holds.  
 















′ +− = − α > ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
∂∂ ∂∂ =−
∂π ∂π ∂π ∂π
, (A5) 
 
where the positive sign follows from the inequalities from above; hence, 
HL
HH LL B( q )B( q ) > .   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4: 
We maximise expected utility (5) with respect to r and q subject to (28). By use of (23) – (25), 
the first-order conditions of this maximisation problem are 
 
  ( )
s s j i
ij i j 1ij i j 1ij A u(c ) u(c ) 0 ′′ αππ σ + +λππ =  (A6) 
  ( ) ()
w w j i
ij i j 1ij j i i j j i 1ij A (1 )u (c ) (1 )u (c ) (1 ) (1 ) 0 ′′ απ − π + π − π − λπ − π + π − π = , (A7) 
 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (28). From (A6) and (A7) together 
with (24), (25) and (11) we find that maximisation requires (29). From (29) one concludes that 
for any arbitrarily given Aij, rij/kij = 2 for σ = 1. The same applies for logarithmic utility (14), as 
(29) reduces to  ij ij r( 2 A) kA =  by use of (14).  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 6: 
Consider any pooling contract (r,k), which fulfils the zero-profit condition (30) together with 
rk ≥  HL 22 ( ) −π + π . Due to Lemma 5, we know that for any such contract (r,k), pLL < pLH and 
pLL < pHH. It follows that pLL is negative and (pLH + pHH) is positive, otherwise the LHS of (30)   41
would be non-zero. This implies that given that only type-LL couples buy the contract (r,k), it 
would make positive profits. By continuity, this holds for any contract (r r,k k) +δ +δ  in the 
neighbourhood of (r,k). 9 
 
Equivalently, for any pooling contract, which fulfils (30) together with rk <  HL 22 ( ) −π + π , it 
follows from Lemma 5 that pHH < pLH and pHH < pLL. Therefore, in order that the LHS of (30) is 
equal to zero, pHH < 0 and (pLH + pLL) > 0. This implies that annuity companies make a positive 
profit, given that only couples of type HH buy this pooling contract (r,k) or one close to it.  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 7 
(34a) and (35b) are fulfilled by definition. That (35a) is fulfilled, follows from  LH LH HH HH ˆˆ ˆˆ rk rk < , 
from the fact that  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) are on the same indifference curve VHH for couple HH 
and that the slope of the indifference curve going through  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) is flatter for couple LH than 
for couple HH. Equivalently, (36a) holds, because  LL LL LH LH ˆˆ ˆˆ rk rk < ,  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  are 
on the same indifference curve VLH for couple LH and that the slope of the indifference curve 
going through  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  is flatter for couple LL than for couple LH. The conjunction of the 
arguments, given to show that (35a) hold, with those, given to show that (36a), implies that also 
(34b) and (36b) hold.   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 8 
1)   Consider the indifference curve VHH of couple HH. By definition, at  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) VHH is tangent 
to zero-profit line ZPHH, while due to strict convexity of VHH, at any payoff-ratio r/k < 2, the 
slope of VHH is steeper than that of ZPHH. From these observations it follows that 
(a)  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) as the point of intersection of VHH and ZPLH, where  LH LH ˆ ˆ r2 k < , lies below the 
straight line S1, which goes through the point of intersection of ZPHH and ZPLH. It follows 
that any contract on ZPLH, which lies above VHH, is characterised by a payoff-ratio, 
where ZPHH lies below ZPLH. By this, any such contract would be chosen by couple HH 
and hence produce a loss. 
(b)  the point of intersection of VHH and ZPLL, where r < 2k, denoted as D in Figure 3, lies 
below the straight line S2, which goes through the point of intersection of ZPHH and 
ZPLL. It follows that any contract on ZPLL, which lies above VHH, is characterised by a 
payoff-ratio, where ZPHH lies below ZPLL. By this, any such contract would be chosen by 
couple HH and hence produce a loss. 
 
2)  Given a value πL ≤ 0.5, ZPLL lies above ZPLH for any payoff-ratio r/k (compare Corollary 2). 
Hence, to prove (ii) of Lemma 8, it suffice to show that given a value πL > 0.5, as drawn in 
Figure 1,  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  is characterised by a payoff-ratio below the straight line S3, at which   42
ZPLH and ZPLL intersect. Consider the indifference VLH of couple LH, which crosses ZPLH at 
LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and ZPLL at  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) . We know from 1a) of this Proof that  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) lies below S1 
and hence also below S3, which is immediate from Corollary 2. From this, together with the 
fact that VLH is strictly convex, that at  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) the slope of VLH is steeper than that of ZPLH, 
and that  LL LL LH LH ˆˆ ˆˆ rk rk < , it follows that  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  also lies below S3. Altogether, any 
contract on ZPLL and above VLL is characterised by a payoff-ratio, where ZPLL lies above 
ZPLH. By this, any such contract would be chosen by couple LH and hence produce a loss.    
 
Finally note that due to the single crossing-property of the indifference curves Vij,   
-  any contract on ZPLH, which is preferred to  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) by couple LH, is also chosen by couple 
HH (but not by couple LL), and then - due to 1a) of this Proof - produces a loss. 
-  any contract on ZPLL, which is preferred to  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  by couple LL, is chosen also by couple 
LH or by couple LH and HH, and then - due to 2) and 1b) of this Proof - produces a loss.  
   Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3  
Note first that if  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) is part of the separating equilibrium, then  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  must 
be the other parts:  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) provides maximum utility for couple LH, subject to the self-selection 
constraint (34a) for couple HH and the zero-profit condition (28) for ij = LH. With  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and 
LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ), (34a) is fulfilled with equality. On the one hand, note from Figure 3 that the second 
point of intersection of VHH and ZPLH, as well as all contracts on ZPLH below this point of 
intersection and also those above  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) fulfil (34a). However, they all provide lower utility for 
couple LH, remember the single-crossing property. On the other hand, as explored in the text 
and shown in Lemma 8, all contracts on ZPLH, which provide a higher utility than  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) for 
couple LH, would be also chosen by couple HH and then produce a loss. Equivalently,  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  
provides maximum utility for couple LL, subject to the self-selection constraint (35b) for couple 
LH and the zero-profit condition (28) for ij = LL. With  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) , (35b) is fulfilled 
with equality. Again we have: All contracts on ZPLL above  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  and below the second the 
second point of intersection of VLH with ZPLL as well as this point of intersection fulfil (35b), but 
provide lower utility for couple LL. All other contracts on ZPLL, which lie above VLL, can be 
excluded as part of the equilibrium due to Lemma 8.  
 
Further, one observes that, for the same reason, if any other contract  HH HH (r ,k ) ′ ′  on ZPHH is part 
of the separating equilibrium, then the second part  LH LH (r ,k ) ′ ′  must be found as the point of 
intersection of ZPLH with the indifference curve of couple HH trough  HH HH (r ,k ) ′′, where 
LH LH r2 k ′′ < , and the third part  LL LL (r ,k ) ′′ must be found as the point of intersection of ZPLL with 
the indifference curve of couple LH trough  LH LH (r ,k ) ′ ′ , where  LL LL r2 k ′ ′ < . Obviously, couples of   43
type HH prefer  HH HH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) to any other  HH HH (r ,k ) ′ ′ , couples of type LH prefer  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) to any 
other  LH LH (r ,k ) ′′ and couples of type LL prefer  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  to any other  LL LL (r ,k ) ′ ′ .   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4  
A variation of the share γ of the high-risk types only influences the zero-profit condition (30) for a 
pooling contract with positive annuity demand Aij > 0 for at least two types ij ∈ {LL,LH,HH}, while 
leaving the zero-profit condition (28) for a separate contract (and the indifference curves, of 
course) unchanged. Comparison of (30) and (28) makes the following obvious: If γ approaches 
to one, the zero-profit condition (30) for any pooling contract with AHH > 0, ALH > 0 and ALL ≥ 0 
converges to the zero-profit condition (28) for couple HH and the zero-profit condition (30) for a 
pooling contract with AHH = 0, ALH > 0 and ALL > 0 converges to the zero-profit condition (28) for 
couple LH.  
 
Further note from Figure 4 and Lemma 7 the following: Couple LH prefers  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) to any 
contract on ZPHH where  LH LH ˆ ˆ rk r k >  and that couple LL prefers  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  to any contract on 
ZPLH, where  LL LL ˆ ˆ rk r k > . Hence, any contract (r,k), which is preferred by couple LH to 
LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ), lies above ZPHH, if  LH LH ˆ ˆ rk r k > , which is then also preferred by couple HH, and may 
or may not be preferred by couple LL. Equivalently, any contract (r,k), which is preferred by 
couple LL to  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) , lies above ZPLH, if  LL LL ˆ ˆ rk r k > , which is then also preferred by couple 
LH, and may or may not be preferred by couple HH. 
 
From the above considerations it follows that for or γ → 1 
(i)  any contract which is preferred by couples of type LH and HH to their separate contract 
LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and  HH, HH ˆ ˆ (r k ), resp., but is not preferred by couples of type LL to  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) , must 
lie above ZPHH and, by continuity, also above the zero-profit condition ZPP2 for a pooling 
contract with AHH > 0, ALH >0, ALL = 0, as long as γ is sufficiently close to one. Thus any 
such pooling contract makes negative profits. 
(ii)  any contract which is preferred by couples LL and LH to their separate contract  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k )  
and  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ), resp., but not by couples HH to  HH, HH ˆ ˆ (r k ), must lie above ZPLH and by 
continuity also above the zero-profit condition ZPP3 for a pooling contract with AHH = 0, ALH > 
0, ALL > 0, as long as γ is sufficiently close to one. Thus any such pooling contract makes 
negative profits.  
(iii) any contract which is preferred by couples of all three types ij = LL,LH,HH to their separate 
contract  LL LL ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) ,  LH LH ˆ ˆ (r ,k ) and  HH, HH ˆ ˆ (r k ), resp., must lie above ZPLH and by continuity also 
above the zero-profit condition ZPP1 for a pooling contract with AHH > 0, ALH > 0, ALL > 0, as 
long as γ is sufficiently close to one. Thus any such pooling contract makes negative profits.  
   44
Finally we note that for each case (i) – (iii) there exists an infimum of all γ, for which a pooling 
contract which is preferred by the respective couples ij, makes a negative profit. We define 
* γ  
as the largest value of all three infima. It follows that for any γ ≥ 
* γ  a separating equilibrium 
exists. On the other hand, analogous considerations show that for sufficiently small γ, a 
profitable pooling contract, which is preferred by couples of at least two types ij ∈ {LL,LH,HH}, 
always exists.   Q.E.D. 
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